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POLITICAL THICKETS AND CRAZY QUILTS:
REAPPORTIONMENT AND EQUAL PROTECTION

Robert B. McKay*
asked to identify the two most important cases decided by
the Supreme Court of the United States in the twentieth century, informed observers would be likely to name, in whichever
order, Brown v. Board of Education 1 and Baker v. Carr.2 Both
foretold the reordering of fundamental concepts of social or political life in large sectors of the nation, Brown with its condemnation of state-sanctioned segregation, and Baker with its invitation to judicial invalidation of state legislative apportionment
districts. In another sense both cases are curious choices for so
high a ranking. Neither decision required any litigant before
the Court or any other person to adopt or refrain from any specific course of action. In both instances the Court opened up the
question before it for extended debate in the forum of state and
lower federal courts and for the public discussion that inevitably
followed. But only the willfully blind could fail to see in Brown
that segregation in public life was thenceforth doomed, however
quickly or slowly might come its demise. Similarly, in Baker,
even though the Court scarcely hinted whether the allegations of
the complaint in that case stated a violation of constitutional rights,
it would be a bold prognosticator indeed who would find in the
decision no more than a jurisdictional rule.
The public readily grasped the wider implications of both
cases. The import of Brown was so immediately apparent that in
the areas most deeply committed to segregation as a way of life
the decision day, Monday, May 17, 1954, was immediately dubbed
as "Black Monday," and only gradually was there a noticeable
shift from that attitude to reluctant acceptance, at least in many
parts of the South. The reaction to Baker, however, was quite
different. Instead of resistance or at best begrudging acceptance
of a clearly stated principle, as had been the case with Brown,
the apportionment decision induced an immediate, widespread,
indeed eager, rush toward legislative and judicial implementation
of a principle that may have been implicit, but was certainly not
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articulated. Before the end of 1962 at least a dozen legislatures
had met in regular or special session to propose constitutional
change where necessary and to enact statutory modification where
permissible within the local framework; more than sixty lawsuits
had been initiated in state and federal courts challenging existing
apportionment formulas in at least thirty-five states; and public
acceptance of the decision continued on the whole to be enthusiastic.3 Near the end of 1962, doubts began to be expressed
about the wisdom, propriety, and technical competence of the
decision in Baker, a development which might have been anticipated in the light of similar experience following Brown.4 The
voice of the "yes-but" critics began to be heard throughout the
land.5 Apart from the niggling negativism of a few, the criticisms
that have been expressed are seriously and earnestly advanced and
deserve rejoinder in that spirit. An attempt will here be made
to formulate an answer. To explain why the stated fears seem
to this writer in part exaggerated and in part groundless, it is
necessary to review briefly what Baker v. Carr was-and what it
was not.

I.

BAKER

v.

CARR: THE NARROW HOLDING

The Tennessee constitution has required, since 1870, that
the number of representatives and the number of senators in the
two houses of the General Assembly shall each "be apportioned
For a more detailed analysis of these developments, state by state, see Appendix infra.
The Brown decision was protested not only by those who disapproved of the result,
but was criticized as well even by some opponents of segregation who feared usurpation
of its proper role by the Court. Two aspects of the "friendly" criticism deserve notice:
(1) The earliest reaction was from some who found in the decision merely judicial accept•
ance of data from social psychologists and other social scientists as to the harms of
segregation without sanction in the Constitution. For an example of the claims of the
social scientists that led to these charges, see Clark, Desegregation: An Appraisal of the
Evidence, 9 SocIAL IssuES No. 4, at 3 (1953). Reply was not long in coming. For the best
answer, see Cahn, Jurisprudence, 1954 ANNUAL SURVEY AM. L. 809 (1955), and 1955 id.
655 (1956). (2) Several years later a different kind of challenge was made on the ground
that the Court had failed, in Brown and elsewhere, to articulate "neutral principles that
satisfy the mind." Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 HAR.v.
L. R.Ev. 1, 29 (1959). Again appropriate answers were soon made. See, e.g., Pollak, Racial
Discrimination and Judicial Integrity: A Reply to Professor Wechsler, 108 U. PA. L. R.Ev.
1 (1959); Black, The Lawfulness of the School Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421
(1960). Professor Black stated the matter with commendable simplicity: "What the fourteenth amendment, in its historical setting, must be read to say is that the Negro is to
enjoy equal protection of the laws, and that the fact of his being a Negro is not to be
taken to be a good reason for denying him this equality, however 'reasonable' that might
seem to some people. All possible arguments, however convincing, for discriminating
against the Negro, were finally rejected by the fourteenth amendment." Id. at 423.
IS By the end of 1962 at least the following nay-sayers and narrow constructionists,
3

4
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among the several counties or districts, according to the number
of qualified electors in each . . . ." 6 Thus, as the Court stated,
"Tennessee's standard for allocating legislative representation
among her counties is the total number of qualified voters resident in the respective counties, subject only to minor qualifications."7
Between 1901 and 1961, however, despite a requirement for
decennial reapportionment in accordance with the required population standard,8 the legislature had taken no action. Moreover,
the complaint in Baker alleged that the 1901 statute itself failed
to conform to the state constitutional mandate, "but instead arbitrarily and capriciously apportioned representatives in the Senate
and House without reference . . . to any logical or reasonable
formula whatever." 9 Meanwhile, the number of persons eligible
to vote more than quadrupled, while there was at the same time
a substantial shift in the centers of population, particularly from
rural to urban areas. And so it was "primarily the continued
application of the 1901 Apportionment Act to this shifted and
enlarged voting population" that gave rise to the controversy.10
The action was brought under sections 1983 and 1988 of 42
U.S.C. to redress alleged deprivation of federal constitutional
rights, specifically claiming that plaintiffs, as eligible voters in
urban areas, had been denied the equal protection of the laws "by
virtue of the debasement of their votes.'' 11 This ultimate question
of substance was not decided. Instead, as Mr. Justice Brennan
summarized the opinion which he wrote for the majority, the
holding was narrow:
"In light of the District Court's treatment of the case we
hold today only (a) that the court possessed jurisdiction of
sophisticated critics all, had expressed their reservations about the substance or the
technique of the decision in Baker. Bickel, The Durability of Colegrove v. Green, 72
YALE L.J. 39 (1962); Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and Its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 673 (1962);
McCloskey, Foreword: The Reapportionment Case, 76 HARv. L. REv. 54 (1962); Neal,
Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUPRE!l!E COURT REv. 252. The
carefully-wrought contribution of Professor Lucas in this symposium issue should also
be included in this category: Legislative Reapportionment and Representative Government: The Meaning of Baker v. Carr, 61 MzcH. L. REv. 711 (1963).
6 TENN. CoNsr. art. II, §§ 5, 6. In the house of representatives it is further provided
that the number "shall never exceed ninety-nine" (§ 5), while in the senate the number
"shall not exceed one-third the number of representatives" (§ 6).
7 369 U.S. at 189.
8 TENN. CoNsr. art. II, § 4.
9 369 U.S. at 192.
10 Ibid.
11 Id. at 188.
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the subject matter; (b) that a justiciable cause of action is
stated upon which appellants would be entitled to appropriate relief; and (c) because appellees raise the issue before
this Court, that the appellants have standing to challenge
the Tennessee apportionment statutes. Beyond noting that
we have no cause at this stage to doubt the District Court
will be able to fashion relief if violations of constitutional
rights are found, it is improper now to consider what remedy
would be most appropriate if appellants prevail at the trial." 12
Despite the Court's careful-and proper-limitation of the
reach of its decision, the reader of the opinion is scarcely required
to suspend belief that there is more. To suggest that a majority
of the Court found no fault with the Tennessee apportionment
structure would strain credulity. There were arguably two constitutional defects in the Tennessee scheme: (1) There was a
severe imbalance between qualified electors and representation in
both houses of the General Assembly; 13 and (2) even apart from
population disparities, the Tennessee apportionment was, in the
words of Mr. Justice Clark, "a crazy quilt without rational basis."H
That the two issues may raise problems of differing seriousness is
foretold by the fact that Mr. Justice Clark suggested that in his
view even substantial disparity of population among voting districts "might not on its face be an 'invidious discrimination,' " 1 u
thus perhaps finding no constitutional barrier to a favoring of
rural districts over urban. But where there is not even that rationality in the allocation of representation, Mr. Justice Clark
specifically found, and presumably all others of the majority would
find, violation of equal protection. So at least the opinions were
read by the Tennessee legislature and the three-judge federal district court to which the Supreme Court remanded Baker; both
concluded without great difficulty that the original apportionment plan was defective. 16
12 Id. at 197-98. In his concurring opinion Mr. Justice Stewart, quoting portions of the
above passage, emphasized that the Court "today decides three things and no more •.•."
Id. at 265.
13 The record showed that 37% of the voters of Tennessee elected 20 of the 33
senators, while 40% of the voters elected 63 of the 99 members of the house. 369 U.S. at
253 (Clark, J., concurring).
14 Id. at 254.
15 Id. at 253.
16 Pursuant to the call of the Governor of Tennessee, the General Assembly convened
in extraordinary session on May 29, 1962, and enacted two separate reapportionment acts.
Public Chapters Numbers 1 and 3, June 6, both approved by the Governor June 7, 1962.
Both acts, despite some improvements from the 1901 statute, were found to be constitutionally defective by the three-judge court on remand. Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341
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Ultimately, then, Baker v. Carr involved two issues, one of
jurisdiction and one of substance. The problem might be characterized simply, yet not inaccurately, as whether the federal
courts can and should take jurisdiction of claims that state apportionment schemes violate constitutional guarantees and, if so, how
the courts should determine and apply relevant standards for
judgment. Before Baker the first question, whether federal courts
can exercise jurisdiction in state apportionment cases, had been
made to appear difficult, both by the Court and commentators.
Now that the Court has given to this question an understandable
answer that cuts through doctrinal confusion, some commentators concentrate on re-fighting that settled issue without facing
the admittedly difficult second question, that of fixing relevant
standards. On this second question the Court gave no hint of an
ultimate answer (and has been criticized accordingly17) beyond the
placid observation that "we have no cause at this stage to doubt
the District Court will be able to fashion relief if violations of
constitutional rights are found . . . . " 18 Behind this confident
assertion lurk the two hard questions: (1) How shall "violations
of constitutional rights" be judged? Clearly the Court did not intend final disposition of the question in telling the lower courts
that they are empowered to act when they find "arbitrary and
capricious" state action resulting in voter discrimination, 19 or action that results in "invidious discrimination," 20 or action that is
"without any possible justification in rationality." 21 (2) How shall
the lower courts "fashion relief"? Mr. Justice Frankfurter gave
solemn warning of the problems that he believed would be encountered in the fulfillment of the task by-passed by the majority.
"Even assuming the indispensable intellectual disinterestedness on the part of judges in such matters, they do not have
accepted legal standards or criteria or even reliable analogies
to draw upon for making judicial judgments. To charge
courts with the task of accommodating the incommensurable
factors of policy that underlie these mathematical puzzles
(M.D. Tenn. 1962). It is interesting to note that the merits of the 1901 statute were never
passed on by the court. In a pre-trial conference before the new legislation was enacted,
the defendants stated that they would not attempt to defend the 1901 law. Id. at 345.
17
18
19

20
21

See, e.g., McCioskey, supra note 5, at 62-64.
369 U.S. at 198.
Id. at 226.
Id. at 253 (Clark, J., concurring).
Id. at 265 (Stewart, J., concurring).
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is to attribute, however flatteringly, omnicompetence to
judges." 22
The answer will be suggested here that solution of these problems
is not beyond judicial competence and that postponement of decision of these questions was not only permissible, but born of
the wisdom of judicial experience. Once it is conceded, as it must
be, that the decision of justiciability thrust the Court into a previously untested arena of judgment, it becomes inevitably clear
that discretion and valor become one in postponing immediate
formulation of criteria for future judgment. Nor is there anything novel in announcing for the first time a new proposition of
constitutional doctrine and leaving its implementation for future
development on a case-by-case basis.23
In another sense the two questions suggested above, whether
the courts should intervene to right apportionment wrongs, and
how they should do so, amount to a single question only: whether
the equal protection clause is sturdy enough to support a superstructure of judicial inquiry into legislative processes heretofore
described as "political," and correction thereof to the extent
found constitutionally deficient. It is this issue which prompts
disagreement between the majority and the dissenters. It should
be frankly recognized that the framing of issues in terms of
jurisdiction, justiciability, and standing serves only to mask the
basic disagreement on whether courts can act profitably in
the review of legislative arrangements. The issue is not whether
the equal protection clause is applicable, but whether sufficient
meaning can be extracted from its imprecise command to serve
as a basis for remedial action within judicial competence. The
only conceivable reasons, to put it bluntly, for refusing the courts
even the power of examination would be a belief either that even
the grossest malapportionment is within the unrestrained power
of state constitutions and legislatures, or that the price of seeking
judicial remedy involves too great a distortion of the judicial
process. To deny recognition to fundamental constitutional issues
and to retreat from correction of wrongs discovered by inquiry
Id. at 268. See also id. at 269-70, 329-30; id. at 337 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
To cite only recent examples, see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); United States
v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 21 (1960); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956); Brown v. Board
of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Each was criticized initially for its failure to answer future
questions of application, but the principle announced in each case is still being tested in
new situations, some of which could not have been anticipated when the decision was
announced.
22

23
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would be a sad confession of judicial inability. That admission of
impotence should not be made without first exploring all possibilities and finding them unavailing. This is written in the confident belief that the command of the equal protection clause
can be vindicated within the framework and traditions of the
judicial process.
Those who doubt judicial power seem to say: No matter
how great the inequities, the courts are not suited to the corrective
process. Professor Louis Pollak has effectively answered this contention:
"Does not the answer lie elsewhere than in a quest for
standards of justiciability? Does not the answer lie in the
dissenters' apparent view that on the merits, taking their
complaint at full value, the appellants in Baker v. Carr
should not prevail? Were not the dissenters really resolving
the justiciability question by reference to the Court's prior
reading of the equal protection clause as a concept which did
not 'deny a State the power to assure a proper diffusion of
political initiative as between its thinly populated counties
and those having concentrated masses .. .'?"24
There is considerable justification for reading both the Frankfurter and Harlan dissents for the proposition that no malapportionment, however severe, should be held to violate the equal
protection clause.25 If that reading is correct, would it not be
preferable to encourage argument on that issue of substance
rather than on artful avoidance of the ultimate question as to
whether constitutional rights are involved and whether they are
in fact in jeopardy?
Perhaps it is still premature to argue that the majority were
right in allowing the debate to progress to the merits. No one
who respects legal history can ignore the substantial body of judicial folklore which suggests that courts that would enter the
"political thicket" 26 may find all exits barred by nettles.
The question is fundamental. Inescapably involved are questions of judicial power and obligation. To what extent must
federal courts decide questions properly presented to them, and
in what narrowly circumscribed circumstances may they properly
24 Pollak, Judicial Power and "The Politics of the People," 72 YALE L.J. 81, 85 (1962).
1169 U.S. at 266, l!l!O.
:26 The expressive phrase is of course taken from Mr. Justice Frankfurter's opinion in
Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946).
!lll
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avoid decision when it is difficult, or likely to be unpopular, or
when it might lead to frictions that the Constitution was intended
to avoid?

II.

THE OBLIGATION To DECIDE

The starting point seems clear. When there is presented to a
federal court in proper form a question "arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority," 27 the federal court
to which the question is presented is obligated to decide the case
except in narrowly confined instances. Mr. Chief Justice Marshall
stated, or perhaps overstated, the proposition in 1821:
"It is most true, that this court will not take jurisdiction if
it should not: but it is equally true, that it must take jurisdiction if it should. The judiciary cannot, as the legislature
may, avoid a measure because it approaches the confines of
the constitution. We cannot pass it by because it is doubtful. With whatever doubts, with whatever difficulties, a case
may be attended, we must decide it, if it be brought before
us. We have no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not given.
The one or the other would be treason to the constitution.
Questions may occur, which we would gladly avoid; but we
cannot avoid them. All we can do is, to exercise our best
judgment, and conscientiously to perform our duty." 28

The statement, like many others of the Chief Justice, makes
with telling force a still-valid central point, but leaves little room
for the qualifications now ordinarily accepted on its generality.
Without meaning to state those exceptions comprehensively, the
following enumeration will illustrate the point that the fact of
judicial power does not always insure its exercise. Then it will be
possible to search out common denominators that justify selfrestraint in some instances, while demonstrating the impropriety
of withholding judgment in other circumstances.29
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
The exceptional classes listed in the text do not include those suits which do not
present a "case or controversy" as required by article III of the Constitution. In the
absence thereof, whether for mootness, because an advisory opinion is sought, or for other
reason showing absence of a case or controversy, not only is there no mandate for federal
judicial decision, but it is in fact forbidden. Nor does the present listing include instances
in which by statute the federal courts are restricted in particular instances from exercising
jurisdiction that would otherwise be within federal judicial power. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1341-42, 2283 (1958): § 1341 (restriction on interference with state taxing power);
27
28
29
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1. The "political question" doctrine. Until the decision in
Baker this was possibly the largest and certainly the most unconfined of the exceptional bases for withholding jurisdiction.
2. The requirement of standing. 30
3. Avoidance of decision on constitutional questions where
decision can be based on other grounds. The Court has "developed,
for its own governance in the cases confessedly within its jurisdiction, a series of rules under which it has avoided passing upon a
large part of all the constitutional questions pressed upon it for
decision. " 31
4. The doctrine of equitable abstention.32
5. The doctrine of forum non conveniens.33
6. The exercise of discretion in granting or withholding declaratory relief. 34
7. Refusal of jurisdiction for lack of competence in matters
of probate35 and domestic relations. 36
Each of the foregoing enumerated bases for restricting federal
jurisdiction is designed to promote efficiency of judicial administration or to avoid federal-state conflict. And each undoubtedly
serves one of those purposes to some extent when sparingly employed. Yet it must always be remembered that they are in every
instance devices that limit the exercise of the power of decision
vested in the federal courts pursuant to the constitutional grant
of power to Congress, and as specifically conferred on the courts
by Congress. Where Congress has made no exception to its grant,
the fair inference is that the federal courts should-or must-act
in the absence of especially compelling reasons for refusing to do
§ 1342 (restriction on interference with rate orders of state agencies); and § 2283 (restric-

tion on stay of state court proceedings). See also Norris-La Guardia Act, 47 Stat. 70
(1932), 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1958) (restricting issuance of injunctions in labor disputes).
30 See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497 (1961); Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447
(1923).
31 Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring). See also
United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 320 (1946).
32 See, e.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219 (1959); County of Allegheny v. Frank
Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185 (1959); Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360
U.S. 45 (1959); Harrison v. NAACP, 360 U.S. 167 (1959); Louisiana Power & Light Co. v.
City of Thibodau.x, 360 U.S. 25 (1959); Meredith v. City of Winter Haven, 320 U.S. 228
(1943); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496 (1941); Thompson v. Magnolia
Petroleum Corp., 309 U.S. 478 (1940).
33 See Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501 (1947). Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (1958);
Norwood v. Kirkpatrick, 349 U.S. 29 (1955).
34 Sec, e.g., Public Serv. Comm'n v. Wycoff Co., 344 U.S. 237 (1952).
35 See, e.g., Sutton v. English, 246 U.S. 199 (1918).
36 See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1858). See also HART &
WECHSLER, TH.E F.ED.ERAL COURTS AND TH.E FED.ERAL SYSTEM 1013-18 (1953).
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so. It is in this light that nearly all judicially created exceptions to
the congressional mandate have provoked controversy and division within the Court and criticism outside. Of none is this more
true than in relation to the "political question" doctrine.
In Baker the complaint plainly alleged a substantial federal
question, decision of which could be avoided, in the framework
of established exceptions to the exercise of federal judicial power,
only if the question presented for decision should be deemed a
"political question." Whatever else the decision may be, it clearly
answers that question in the negative, and thus the matter requires
decision on the merits. Having lost on that ground, those who
nonetheless favor judicial abstention in the area of apportionment
raise the spectre of damage to the Court's authority which, as Mr.
Justice Frankfurter puts it, "ultimately rests on sustained public
confidence in its moral sanction." 37 Professor Robert McCloskey
has expressed the same concern: "If the public should ever become convinced that the Court is merely another legislature, that
judicial review is only a euphemism for an additional layer in the
legislative process, the Court's future as a constitutional tribunal
would be cast in grave doubt." 38 These are solemn warnings; but
should not the Court equally be concerned about loss of public
confidence for failure to decide where decision is called for? Failure of action where the duty to act is mandatory is at least as
grave as a too-ready willingness to act where artful avoidance is
possible. Once again, it is apparent that the matter comes down to
a question whether appropriate standards can be devised. If so,
no one defends failure to decide.

A. "Political Questions" and Political Thickets
Only one observation could be made with complete confidence
concerning the so-called "political question" cases before the decision in Baker, and that was that no way had been discovered of
reconciling all the holdings and opinions dealing with the subject.
One of the incidental doctrinal benefits in Baker is that Mr. Justice
Brennan for the Court has assembled the cases with a new orderliness of doctrine that could never have been done by any off-Court
commentator lacking the fiat of a majority of Supreme Court
Justices. 39 It is easy for those with no affirmative obligation to
rationalize a decision, whether as dissenters on the Court40 or as
37
38
39
40

369 U.S. at 267 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
McCloskey, supra note 5, at 67.
369 U.S. at 210.
369 U.S. at 277-80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
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commentators,41 to complain that force-molding of some cases is
the price of producing a pattern for the future out of what had
before been chaos. But this is to disregard the fact that synthesis
has never before been apparent either in Supreme Court decisions
or commentary by scholars of the Court. The simple truth is that
the cases, particularly the per curiam decisions,42 simply could not
be arranged into a meaningful whole. To concede that, in order
to find that patterned order, it was necessary to "explain" some
cases to fit the enunciated principle is not in derogation of the
new orderliness-far from it. Rather, it is simply to recognize that
coherent synthesis would not otherwise have been cogently possible. Mr. Justice Brennan, while avoiding the opposite difficulty
of outright overrulings, nevertheless seems to have recognized,
even for the record, the problem he faced, when he said:
"Our discussion, even at the price of extending this opinion,
requires review of a number of political question cases, in
order to expose the attributes of the doctrine-attributes
which, in various settings, diverge, combine, appear, and
disappear in seeming disorderliness." 43
The Court's systematization of the "political question" cases
was of course not an end in itself. It was undertaken with the
specific objective of determining whether earlier decisions could
on any comprehensive and fair reading be taken as an obstacle
to decision of the Baker case. As already indicated, this inquiry
produced as an incidental benefit the most comprehensive and
orderly analysis of the "political question" doctrine that has yet
been undertaken in any Supreme Court opinion. Equally, it
appears to be at least as careful and thorough as any recent analysis
by a non-Court commentator, who could not in any event catalogue
cases with equivalent authority. Mr. Justice Brennan's opinion
on the "political question" issue has been approved by some44 and
41 Neal, supra note 5, at 255-59. Cf. Lucas, Dragon in the Thicket: A Perusal of
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 1961 SUPREME COURT REv. 194, 215-31.
42 Matthews v. Handley, 361 U.S. 127 (1959); Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958);
Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957); Kidd v. Mccanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson
v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936 (1952); Remmey v. Smith, 342
U.S. 916 (1952); Tedesco v. Board of Supervisors, 339 U.S. 940 (1950); South v. Peters, 339
U.S. 276 (1950); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947); Cook v. Fortson, 329 U.S. 675
(1946). For Mr. Justice Brennan's handling of these cases, see 369 U.S. at 234-37.
43 369 U.S. at 210.
44 Although warning of potential dangers in future litigation, Professor McCloskey
appears to approve the fact that "the political question doctrine has been considerably
narrowed." McCloskey, supra note 5, at 61. See also Pollak, supra note 24.
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criticized by others. 45 No matter. The important thing, the useful
thing, which he accomplished was the bringing of order out of
chaos. And that, undeniably, he did. At the.risk of oversimplifying
a still-complex question, it is fair to say that he began with the
central proposition that "the non-justiciability of a political question is primarily a function of the separation of powers." 46 To
constitute a "political question" within this frame there must be
"a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of
the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of
judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial
policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's undertaki~g independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect
due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already
made; or the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious
pronouncements by various departments on one question." 47
On the basis of that analysis-and the cases support it remarkably well-there emerge two central justifications for judicial noninterference on "political question" grounds. First, any matter
calling for decision by a parallel and co-equal branch of the national government, Congress or the executive; and, second, any
matter where "judicially discoverable and manageable standards"
are lacking. Clearly, as to the first, decision of state apportionment
questions does not impinge upon the tripartite separation of
powers at the national level, so the only relevant question on this
score is whether adequate standards of judgment can be devised.
It has already been noted that the Court so stated, at the level of
simple assertion, that standards are not lacking. If that proposition
is in fact true, as claimed, then this aspect of the "political question" problem vanishes.
One further inquiry remains in connection with "political
questions." This is the too-much debated question of the relevancy
of Colegrove v. Green.48 There can no longer be any doubt that
Colegrove did not hold that jurisdiction was lacking to decide the
See, e.g., Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAw
PROB. 329 (1962); Lucas, supra note 5. See materials cited in note 41 supra.
46 369 U.S. at 210.
47 Id. at 217.
48 328 U.S. 549 (1946).

45
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claim that the disparity of population among the Illinois congressional districts was an unconstitutional infringement of plaintiff's right of franchise. Even Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who spoke
for three of the four-Justice majority, has acknowledged that the
refusal to take the case on the merits was "not in the strict sense a
want of power." 49 Rather, it was a ruling that in the particular
circumstances "a federal court should not entertain" the action. 50
Whatever doubts might have been entertained about the holding in Colegrove should surely have been dispelled by the Court's
review on the merits of later cases involving related questions. In
MacDougall v. Green, 51 for example, the Court reviewed the
merits and found no constitutional defect in an Illinois election
law requirement of 200 signatures from each of at least fifty counties for an effective nominating petition.
On the question of jurisdiction, in the sense of judicial competence to examine questions of alleged deprivation of equal protection of the laws, there can be no doubt that the Court acted
·within permissible limits in permitting lower courts to reach the
merits in Baker and other cases raising related issues. The fact
that the Court has in the past frequently avoided decision in cases
that directly or indirectly raised challenges to various apportionment formulas of course does not mean that reluctance to deal
with difficult questions must remain the norm. As already noted,
Mr. Justice Brennan provides a satisfactory legal handle for the
proposition that the Court has never really refused decision of
apportionment cases even on "political question" grounds, there
having always been some other basis for refusal of decision. 52 But
even if this is not persuasive to some, as it was not to Justices
Frankfurter and Harlan,53 it is now of little moment. Since the
Court admittedly has the power of decision, the only relevant
question is whether the matter is "meet for judicial determination. "54 If so, that is, if "judicially manageable standards" can be
devised, all agree that federal courts should inquire into allegations of constitutional wrong and take appropriate action.
369 U.S. at 277.
Ibid. Mr. Justice Rutledge, whose vote was necessary to the result in Colegrove,
concluded only that "the bill should be dismissed for want of equity." 328 U.S. at 565.
He did not at all deny jurisdiction.
ul 335 U.S. 281 (1948).
ti2 369 U.S. at 232-37. See also note 42 supra.
53 Id. at 277-80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
54 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 552 (1946).
-10

50
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B. "Republican Form of Government"
Apparently the disapprovers do not take any particular exception thus far (although doubtful as to whether standards for judgment can be found). Instead, the point of difference has now been
narrowed to an inquiry whether the constitutional guarantee in
article IV, section 4, of a republican form of government presents
a "political question" barrier to consideration of apportionment
cases. 55 Mr. Justice Brennan for the majority, agreeing that the
guarantee clause cases do present "political questions" not appropriate for federal judicial consideration, concluded that the
apportionment cases do not raise these issues because "the nonjusticiability of such claims has nothing to do with their touching
upon matters of state governmental organization." 56 But here the
dissenters took issue, particularly Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who
said that "to divorce 'equal protection' from 'Republican Form'
is to talk about half a question." 57 And again, "The present case
involves all of the elements that have made the Guarantee Clause
cases non-justiciable. It is, in effect, a Guarantee Clause claim
masquerading under a different label." 58 Mr. Justice Brennan,
however, took a close look at all the precedents and concluded
that the instant case lacked the characteristics common to the
guarantee clause cases that had made them non-justiciable.

"The question here is the consistency of state action with the
Federal Constitution. We have no question decided, or to be
decided by a political branch of government coequal with this
Court. Nor do we risk embarrassment of our government
abroad, or grave disturbance at home if we take issue with
Tennessee as to the constitutionality of her action here challenged. Nor need the appellants, in order to succeed in this
action, ask the Court to enter upon policy determinations for
which judicially manageable standards are lacking. Judicial
standards under the Equal Protection Clause are well developed and fam1·1·iar .... "59
55 See Bonfield, The Guarantee Clause of Article IV, Section 4: A Study in Constitu•
tional Desuetude, 46 MINN. L. REv. 513 (1962); Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the
Constitutional Guarantee of Republican Government, 50 CALIF. L. REV. 245 (1962).
56 369 U.S. at 218.
57 Id. at 301.
58 Id. at 297.
59 Id. at 226. Some have suggested that in Baker and earlier cases the Court has read
too much into the guarantee clause cases by way of a finding of non-justiciability. The
suggestion is made that, however appropriate may have been the application of the
equal protection clause in a case of de facto malapportionment such as Baker, the
guarantee clause should be utilized in cases of de jure malapportionment (as in Michigan,
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And so we have come full circle. The soundness of the defense of
judicial intervention and the objections thereto ultimately differ
only as to whether there are judicially manageable standards. If
so, under either analysis the "political question" problem largely
dissolves, whether conceived in general terms or in terms of the
greater particularity of the guarantee clause. There is, then, no
escaping the crucial nature of the search for standards.

III.

THE SEARCH FOR STANDARDS

Remarkably few of the already substantial number of critics
who pronounce their disenchantment with the decision in Baker
v. Carr have objected on the ground that malapportionment of
state legislative districts should not be thought to violate the Constitution of the United States. Rather, they have suggested the
inappropriateness of judicial intervention or, alternatively, that
this particular decision does not deal adequately with the question
as to whether workable standards can be devised and successfully
imposed. It has already been suggested that these expressed doubts
about judicial power and function--or claimed judicial "omnicompetence," as Mr. Justice Frankfurter would have it60-may
well be but the external mask for an unstated, or at best obliquely
hinted, conviction that the Constitution does not extend-and
cannot be stretched-so far. Both the stated and the implicit arguments are important and deserve reply. The case to be made,
then, and which will here be attempted, can be caught up in a
simple proposition: Irrational malapportionment of state legislatures does violate the fourteenth amendment; satisfactory judicial
standards can be formulated to test the matter; and adequate judicial remedies are available for correction.
It is striking how little these imagined difficulties with standards and remedies have troubled the lower federal courts and state
courts where the issues have so far been tried out. No federal court
has expressed reluctance to accept jurisdiction and to decide the
merits; and state courts, though not bound by the jurisdictional
issues decided in Baker, have also uniformly accepted jurisdiction
where the voters themselves had recently approved the complained-against apportionment).
Sec Bonfield, Baker v. Carr: New Light on the Constitutional Guarantee of Republican
Government, 50 CALIF. L. REv. 245 (1962). See also Emerson, Malapportionment and
Judicial Power, 72 YALE L.J. 64, 66-68 (1962). One may wonder, however, whether the
command of the guarantee clause is indeed more informative than that of equal protection.
60

369 U.S. at 268.

660

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

of apportionment cases. Even on the question of standards, on the
difficulties of which the critics place their principal reliance for
rejecting judicial solution, the federal district courts and state
trial and appellate courts have suggested thoughtful answers; and
there is even evidence of an emerging consensus, as will be noted
later. It is not too much to say that these courts have manifested
an almost surprising enthusiasm for the task of setting in constitutional order the legislative houses over which they have new-found
jurisdiction. Unlike the situation following Brown v. Board of
Education, there is no evidence of judicial foot-dragging about the
necessity of prompt implementation, no talk of abstention in
federal courts to await decision in state courts (and, conversely, no
hesitance by state courts to act when the matter is presented to
them61), and almost no expressed doubt as to the workability of
remedies within the traditional judicial competence. Only a very
strong showing of the absence of judicial power where the courts
themselves express no doubt would now be sufficient to overcome
this pattern of judicial momentum. The truth is, however, that
not only can that kind of showing not be made, but rather that
available evidence points to formulation of entirely serviceable
standards and remedies within accepted notions of judicial competence.
A. Equal Protection in History 62
Writing in 1949, Professors Tussman and tenBroek were more
accurately prophetic than even they could have anticipated when
they stated:
"The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
appears thus to be entering the most fruitful and significant
period of its career. Virtually strangled in infancy by postcivil-war judicial reactionism, long frustrated by judicial
neglect, the theory of equal protection may yet take its rightful place in the unfinished Constitutional struggle for democracy."oa
Their prophecy of a new role for the equal protection clause
01 But cf. Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296, 303 (R.I. 1962), expressing doubt as to the
propriety of a state court order to a state legislature, but no doubt as to the power of
a federal court to issue such an order.
62 See generally HARrus, THE QuEST FOR EQUALITY (1960); Antieau, Equal Protection
Outside the Clause, 40 CALIF. L. REv. 362 (1952); Frank &: Munro, The Original Understanding of "Equal Protection of the Laws," 50 CoLUM. L. REv. 131 (1950).
63 Tussman &: tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CALIF L. REv. 341, 381
(1949).
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would have been amply fulfilled by Brown v. Board of Education
(which must have been what they had in mind); and surely their
prophetic cup runneth over with Baker v. Carr. The basis for their
prediction and the proper contemporary meaning of the equal
protection clause will be subsequently examined; but first the
amenities require a brief detour into the historic origins of the
clause, and its judicial development over the nearly one hundred
years of its existence.
It can scarcely be doubted that the primary thrust of the
equal protection clause when the fourteenth amendment was
ratified in 1868 was to assure equal, or at least more nearly equal,
rights of citizenship to Negroes, both the newly freed and those
who had never been slaves.64 The Supreme Court, in fact, without adequate investigation into the historical sources, early concluded that the equal protection clause dealt exclusively with
protection against racial discrimination. Speaking of the clause
in The Slaughter-House Cases, Mr. Justice Miller said in 1873:
"We doubt very much whether any action of a State not
directed by way of discrimination against the negroes as a
class, or on account of their race, will ever be held to come
within the purview of this provision. It is so clearly a provision for that race and that emergency, that a strong case
would be necessary for its application to any other." 65
Although the Court, and Mr. Justice Miller himself, soon retreated from that narrow and non-literal reading of the clause to
provide shelter for business interests,66 it was at least true that
there had been "no contemporary understanding of the relation
of equal protection to business regulation." 67 That, however, was
to come soon enough. 68
Two years after The Slaughter-House Cases the Court remained faithful to its conviction that the fourteenth amendment
was race-related only and thus offered no protection from limitations on the right of franchise based on sex. In 1875 Mr. Chief
Justice Waite ruled confidently in Minor v. Happersett that "the
Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of
suffrage upon any one, and that the constitutions and laws of the
64 Frank & Munro, supra note 62, at 167-69.
65 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, 81 (1873).
66 See FAmllfAN, MR. JUSTICE MILLER AND THE SUPREME COURT 186-87 (1939).
67 Frank & Munro, supra note 62, at 143.
68 See Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., ll8 U.S. 394 (1886). See also The
Granger Cases, 94 U.S. 155, 164, 179, 180 (1877).
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several States which commit that important trust to men alone are
not necessarily void ...." 69 The Court discussed the issue, however, only in terms of the privileges and immunities clause of the
fourteenth amendment, without any reference to the equal protection clause. The petitioner may well have regarded an appeal
to equal protection as futile in view of The Slaughter-House
Cases; and presumably in 1875 that argument would have been
no more successful than one based on the privileges and immunities clause. Classification to the voting disadvantage of women was
not further tested in the Supreme Court and was finally overcome
by the specifics of the nineteenth amendment almost half a century
later.
Had the issue not been stamped with the imprimatur of stare
decisis at a time when both the privileges and immunities and
equal protection clauses were subject to restrictive interpretation,
hindsight suggests that limitation of franchise rights on grounds
of sex might well have yielded to the importunities of equal protection when the Court made it clear that the clause had a reach
far beyond the more restrictive confines of racial discrimination.
But even under the narrower interpretation of the 1870's, Minor v.
Happersett suggests nothing contrary to the implications of Baker.
It was simply a determination that the state could fix voter qualifications by class. However unlikely a similar result would be today,
even without the nineteenth amendment,70 the ruling is not to
be taken as a holding that a state may authorize a weighting of the
votes of persons otherwise entitled to cast ballots. As will be noted
subsequently, that specific question has never been ruled on by
the Supreme Court, although even before Baker the most nearly
analogous cases strongly suggest disapproval of the dilution of
voter strength.71
After the Slaughter-House and Happersett decisions, the equal
protection clause served in the nineteenth century as a brake on
various gross racially discriminatory practices, as might have been
anticipated from the principal aims of the drafters as noted in
those early cases. 72 That the clause did not serve by any means to
eliminate what would now be regarded as severely discriminatory
88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 162, 178 (1875).
Cf. Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927).
Both invalidated devices under direct or indirect state sponsorship designed to deny
participation in party primaries to Negro citizens otherwise entitled to vote.
71 See text at notes 146-51 infra.
72 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
69
70
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state-supported practices, particularly the segregation imposed by
the Black Codes,73 is not here the point. All that doctrine has now
given way under the irresistibly egalitarian pressures implicit in
the text of the equal protection clause, as construed by the Supreme
Court in Brown and its progeny. That the struggle for desegregation is not yet wholly won does not detract from the importance
of the doctrinal point. Few not emotionally committed to the
practice of segregation now doubt the correctness of the Court's
absolutist reading of the equal protection clause on this point.
Regardless of whether segregation in public schools was intended
to be forbidden by the fourteenth amendment at the time of its
adoption, which is at best doubtful, 74 later research has demonstrated that the words of the equal protection clause were deliberately chosen, resulting in a formulation that "had both sweep
and the appearance of a careful enumeration of rights, and it had
a ring to echo in the national memory of libertarian beginnings." 75
Specifically, the phrase "equal protection of the laws," selected
primarily in reference to matters of racial discrimination, also
carried with it the broadness of phrasing characteristic of organic
law not intended for frequent or easy amendment. The lesson
taught by the commerce clause as to the easy adaptability to contemporary necessities of a broadly phrased power, and by the convenient flexibility of a generalized restriction such as that in the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, could not have been
lost upon the draftsmen who chose "equal protection of the laws"
in preference to an earlier version that would have limited the
equal protection guarantee to the rights of life, liberty, and property, supplemented by a necessary and proper clause. 76
Certainly this was the vantage point of the ruling in Brown
when the Court candidly stated that "in approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment
was adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education in the light of its full
development and its present place in American life throughout
the Nation." 77
73 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896). For a good account of the re-establishment
of segregation after Reconstruction, see ·wooDWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW
(1955).
74 Bickel, The Original Understanding and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARv. L.
REv. 1 (1955); Frank 8: Munro, supra note 62, at 153-62.
7li Bickel, supra note 74, at 62.
76 Id. at 60.
77 Bro%'ll v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 492-93 (1954).
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Of course it is proper to observe that, bold as the Court's action may have seemed in outlawing the long-established segregation mores through the device of the equal protection clause, yet
segregation was a matter at least related to the central purpose of
providing discrimination-free citizenship for Negroes. Candor
requires concession that the right of franchise, also not explicitly
within the intended reach of the drafters, does not relate at all
to discrimination based on race or color or previous condition
of servitude. 78
Yet there is nothing novel in this. The very essence of constitutional litigation is the application of existing constitutional
text to novel situations. The test is not whether the particular application was contemplated by the drafters, ratifiers, and other
participants in the process of constitutional formulation. So long
as the new application was not forbidden and is consistent with
the general framework of constitutional purpose, the rest can be
left to judicial craftsmanship. Perhaps the ultimate test is, to use
Mr. Justice Holmes' words from a different context, "the power
of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the
market ...." 79 Brown and Baker alike have amply satisfied the
test of general public acceptance of the principles announcedand apparently as well of the broader implications.
Apart from the due process clause, scarcely any other clause
in the Constitution has proved itself more adaptable to the temper
of the times than the equal protection clause. After all, as already
observed, it appears as a broadly phrased limitation on the states,
as categorical or as flexible as one might wish to read it. There
are, of course, other specific requirements of equal, or at least
non-discriminatory, treatment in the Constitution, such as the
privileges and immunities clause of article IV, and the thirteenth,
fifteenth, and nineteenth amendments. 80 It is no longer surprising
to find equal protection overtones in the due process clauses of
the fifth81 and fourteenth amendments,82 and even in the first
amendment and the commerce clause. 83 It follows that the equal
protection clause in the fourteenth amendment should be re78 Except, of course, in the case not here at issue where a Negro is denied the vote
because of his race (see note 70 supra), or in the exceptional case of Gomillion v. Light·
foot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
79 Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919).
80 See Antieau, supra note 62.
81 See especially Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
82 Antieau, supra note 62, at 362-66.
83 Id. at 366-68, 370-72.
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garded simply as a general catchall provision to ensure that any
discriminatory action indulged in by a state or with state approval,
not elsewhere specifically forbidden, may fall within the general
prohibition.
So at least the Court has always used the clause. However
clear it may have been that matters of economic regulation and
social welfare legislation were not within the "original understanding," nonetheless the clause was early and long used for just those
purposes. Professor Robert Harris, after analysis of 554 decisions
of the Supreme Court in which the equal protection clause was
invoked, found that "426, or 76.9 per cent, dealt with legislation
affecting economic interests. In turn, 255 of these decisions dealt
with regulation, and 171 with taxation." 84 The influx of these
cases began in significant numbers with the casual pronouncement by Mr. Chief Justice Waite in 1886 that the Court did not
wish to hear argument on the question whether the equal protection clause applied to corporations. "We are all of the opinion
that it does." 85 Subsequent developments in the history of the
clause as a regulation of economic interests are well summarized
by Professor Harris:
"Throughout its constitutional history the equal protection
clause has undergone alternative periods of simultaneous
judicial expansion and contraction. From 1873, when cases
involving economic interests alone began coming to the
Court, until 1937 there was a judicial expansion of the clause
to protect interests of business and property against discriminatory state action. Simultaneously, the Court contracted the privileges and immunities clause and a short time
later considerably restricted the scope of equal protection
with respect to discriminations based upon race. Then in
1937 it began to restrict equal protection as a shield of economic interests and to continue an expansion of the clause
begun two years earlier in the area of racial discrimination." 86

B. The Two Sides of Equal Protection
What has gone before suggests, at least preliminarily, the
point now sought to be made. The equal protection clause, in
op. cit. supra note 62, at 59.
The case was Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R.R., ll8 U.S. 394 (1886). The
remarks of the Chief Justice from the bench, quoted above, were said in the presence
of and apparently with the silent acquiescence of Mr. Justice Miller, who had in 1873
denied the likely application of equal protection concepts to anything except matters of
racial discrimination. See CORWIN, THE CONSfITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
1143 (1953).
86 HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 62, at 58.
84 HARRIS,
Sli
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serving its function of general restraint upon unreasonable classifications imposed by state authority, has been invoked in a number
of diverse contexts. Analytically, however, the cases may be
grouped into two principal categories, each of which has generated
a remarkably different application of the equal protection concept. So different is the doctrinal base for the two that one might
almost say there are two equal protection clauses, or, at least,
since some kinds of discriminatory classification are more readily
forbidden than others, that there is something akin to a scale
of preferences within the equal protection clause itself.
The scheme of classification internal to the equal protection
clause may be stated first as a general proposition, and then explained in more detail. Where the state, in its police power capacity to regulate health, morals, and general welfare, imposes a
classification scheme intended to regulate economic or social welfare matters, the coverage of "reasonableness" is comfortably loose,
and there rests upon him who would challenge the classification a
heavy burden in seeking to overcome the presumption of constitutionality. But where the classification impinges upon the "basic
civil rights of man," 87 the latent libertarianism that always lies
close to the surface of equal protection emerges either to forbid all
classification, because none is permissible, as in segregation cases,
or at the least to overcome the presumption of constitutionality
and to demand rigorous examination of the standards set.
Before more particular examination is made of this suggested
classificatory scheme within a clause which itself makes classification suspect except for good motive and to promote reasonable ends,
this caveat should be entered. The two sides of equal protection
here suggested have not been separately identified by the Court as
a whole, or even clearly articulated by individual members. Rather,
the common practice has been, when equal protection is invoked
and the claim is destined for rejection, to deal with the question
in the loosest possible generalization, fortified by a string of nowfamiliar citations dealing with classification in the regulation of
economic interests. To recite only recent examples, in McGowan
v. Maryland 88 Mr. Chief Justice Warren stated the commonly
accepted formula for these cases when he said: "A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably
may be conceived to justify it." 89 Similarly, in Baker, two of the
87
88
89

Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
366 U.S. 420 (1961).
Id. at 426.
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Justices who concurred in the invocation of the equal protection
clause in connection with state legislative apportionment nonetheless used as their definitional touchstone the standard of "invidious discrimination," 00 a phrase drawn from Williamson v. Lee
Optical Co. 91 in which a clearly unequal classification of economic
interests was sustained for lack of a showing of "invidious discrimination.''
Examination of cases decided under the equal protection
clause reveals, however, a more orderly pattern in the equal protection cases than the imprecise generalizations quoted above
would indicate. Mr. Justice Brennan, writing the opinion of the
Court in Baker, did not lend the force of the majority opinion
to any suggestion that the standards which he described as "welldeveloped and familiar" are to be found in the line of cases
dealing with regulation of economic matters. It is the aim of the
following discussion to analyze the two lines of equal protection
cases and suggest that the standards appropriate for application
in state legislative apportionment litigation are those developed
in connection with cases raising questions involving the "basic
civil rights of man."
I. Regulation of Economic Interests. The course of the equal
protection clause has not been fundamentally different from that
of the due process clause. As the Reconstruction period drew to a
close both due process and equal protection became chiefly identified with substantive rights, and particularly with judicially imposed limitations on the power of states to regulate economic
affairs. Both aspects of that story have been well chronicled92 and
will not be repeated. It is sufficient here to note that since the midthirties the Court has regularly disavowed any significant judicial
authority to pass upon the validity of state economic regulation
under either the due process or the equal protection clause. Due
process claims appear to be altogether unavailing in this area, 93
oo 369 U.S. at 245 (Douglas, J., concurring); 369 U.S. at 253 (Clark, J., concurring).
01 348 U.S. 483, 489 (1955).
92 Due Process: FRANKFURTER, MR. JUSTICE HoLllrES AND THE SUPREME COURT app.
(1938). For a more recent statement, see Lewis, A Newspaperman's View: The Role of
the Supreme Court, 45 A.B.A.J. 9ll (1959). For the somewhat different regard which
many state courts have for due process provisions in their own constitutions, see Carpenter,
Our Constitutional Heritage: Economic Due Process and the State Courts, 45 A.B.A.J. 1027
(1959): Paulsen, The Persistence of Substantive Due Process in the States, 34 MINN. L.
REv. 92 (1950).
Equal Protection: HARRIS, op. cit. supra note 62.
03 Since Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502 (1934), substantive due process has been
applied mainly in connection with claims of individual liberty, such as those involving first
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and equal protection claims in the area of economic regulation
have been successful only rarely. 94
That resort to equal protection should ever upset a state regulatory scheme is testimony not to the vitality of the concept of
judicial supervision of the state regulatory process, but that the
very words "equal protection of the laws" can scarcely be ignored
in some few situations where the economic hurt is severe and
without any conceivable justification in state policy. Thus, in
Morey v. Doud,95 involving the only important application of
equal protection in recent years to invalidate state legislation
regulating economic activity, the act created a closed class by
exempting money orders issued by American Express Company
from regulations applicable to all other issuers of like orders. For
such a statutory discrimination to be sustained, Mr. Justice Burton said, it "must be based on differences that are reasonably related to the purposes of the Act in which it is found." 96 In this case
no such relationship was found, but only a special exemption in
behalf of one favored company. Even on that premise the decision evoked three dissents, one by Mr. Justice Black, and one
subscribed to by both Justices Frankfurter and Harlan. Mr. Justice Frankfurter feared in this a return to a discarded past and
stated his view of the equal protection clause in these words:
"Legislation is essentially empiric. It addresses itself to the
more or less crude outside world and not to the neat, logical
models of the mind. Classification is inherent in legislation;
the Equal Protection Clause has not forbidden it. To recognize marked differences that exist in fact is living law; to
disregard practical differences and concentrate on some abstract identities is lifeless logic." 97
Mr. Justice Black, dissenting separately, expressed the same idea
in objecting "to the use of general provisions of the Constitution to
restrict narrowly state power over state domestic affairs." 08 But
amendment claims. See also Olsen v. Nebraska, 313 U.S. 236 (1941); West Coast Hotel Co.
v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
94 Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957); Wheeling Steel Corp. v. Glander, 337 U.S.
562 (1949) [distinguished in Allied Stores, Inc. v. Bowers, 358 U.S. 522, 526-30 (1959)];
Hillsborough v. Cromwell, 326 U.S. 620 (1946); Hartford Co. v. Harrison, 301 U.S. 459
(1937); Mayflower Farms, Inc. v. Ten Eyck, 297 U.S. 266 (1936).
95 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
96 Id. at 465.
97 Id. at 472.
98 Id. at 471.
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then, noting the separate uses to which equal protection, like due
process, may be put, he continued:
"I think state regulation should be viewed quite differently
where it touches or involves freedom of speech, press, religion, petition, assembly, or other specific safeguards of the
Bill of Rights. It is the duty of this Court to be alert to see
that these constitutionally preferred rights are not abridged." 99
Whether Morey v. Doud and its few companions are regarded
as rare examples of invidious discrimination unsupported by any
legislative purpose, or whether merely as judicial sports, it is
clear at least that they are very exceptional. The volume and
variety of cases in which state economic regulation has been upheld against an equal protection challenge is impressive in size
and in the summary nature of the judicial response to the issue. 100
2. Regulation of "Basic Civil Rights of Man." Equal protection and due. process alike got off to a slow start as defenders of
individual liberty. But just as surely as the restraining power of
these clauses upon state economic regulation has declined almost
to zero, substantive content on the side of individual liberty has
been poured into them at an accelerating rate. Now is not the
time to recount this aspect of the development of the due process
clause, nor is more necessary than a reminder of the role that the
due process clause has played in the absorption of the fundamental
human rights of the Bill of Rights into the fourteenth amendment as a limitation upon the states.101 The parallel developoo lbid.
Recent cases include the following: Two Guys from Harrison-Allentown, Inc.
v. McGinley, 366 U.S. 582 (1962); Gallagher v. Crown Kosher Mkt., 366 U.S. 617 (1961);
Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 (1961); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961);
Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483 (1955); Salsburg v. Maryland, 346 U.S. 545
(1954); Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949); AFL v. American Sash
Co., 335 U.S. 538 (1948); Goesaert v. Cleary, 335 U.S. 464 (1948); Kotch v. Board of River
Port Pilot Comm'rs, 330 U.S. 552 (1947). Earlier decisions that remain leading cases for
statement of still-controlling doctrine include the following: Nashville, C. 8: St. L. Ry.
v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 (1940); Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940); Semler v. Dental
Examiners, 294 U.S. 608 (1935); Metropolitan Cas. Ins. Co. v. Brownell, 294 U.S. 580
(1935); Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
101 First Amendment: Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (freedom of speech);
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) ( freedom of the press); De Jonge v. Oregon, 299
U.S. 353, 364 (1937) (freedom of assembly); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958)
(freedom of association); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (freedom of
religion); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. I (1947) (separation of church and state).
Fourth Amendment: Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Sixth Amendment: Gideon v. Wainwright, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4291 (U.S. March 18, 1963)
overruling Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455 (1942), which had held that counsel was required
only in capital cases and in other cases where absence of counsel would deny due process.
See also Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932).
100
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ment of the equal protection clause as a guardian of individual
liberties was, until recent years, less dramatic, but nonetheless
significant. With decision of the series of cases that have finally
eradicated "separate but equal" as an excuse for segregation,
and the series of cases prompted by Baker, the equal protection
clause moves strikingly into the forefront of the contest for the
advancement of individual liberty. Significant cases in this nearly
century-long development are enumerated in the footnote below,102 and the historical highlights are discussed in the remainder of this section.
Classifications forbidden by the equal protection clause may be
grouped into three categories. First are those in which no purpose
at all is demonstrated or, as Mr. Justice Brennan phrased the same
idea in Baker, where "a discrimination reflects no policy, but
simply arbitrary and capricious action." 103 In the same case Mr.
Justice Clark concluded that the Tennessee apportionment at
issue was so devoid of rational policy that he could describe it as
"a topsy-turvical of gigantic proportions" or as "a crazy quilt
without rational basis."104 As will be noted, a number of state
Eighth Amendment: Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962); Trop v. Dulles, 356
U.S. 86 (1958); Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (cruel and
unusual punishment).

102 Malapportionment:

Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
Obligation of state to provide indigents with transcript necessary for appeal: Smith
v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Griffin v. Illinois, 351
U.S. 12 (1956). Cf. Dowd v. United States, 340 U.S. 206, 208 (1951) (prevention of timely
appeal); Cochran v. Kansas, 316 U.S. 255, 257 (1942) (discriminatory denial of right of
appeal).
Segregation: State Athletic Comm'n v. Dorsey, 359 U.S. 533 (1959); Gayle v. Browder,
352 U.S. 903 (1956); Holmes v. City of Atlanta, 350 U.S. 879 (1955); Mayor &: City Council
v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1955); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); McLaurin
v. Oklahoma, 339 U.S. 637 (1950); Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950); Missouri ex rel.
Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
Restrictive covenants: Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249 (1953); Shelley v. Kraemer, 334
U.S. 1 (1948).
Jury service: Shepherd v. Florida, 341 U.S. 50 (1951); Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282
(1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S. 463 (1947); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945);
Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942); Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940); Pierre v. Louisiana,
306 U.S. 354 (1939); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
88
(l Other
0).
. . . Gomill"10n v. L.1gh toot,
f
36'.., U.S. 339 (1960)
forms o f raa"al a·1scnmmation:
(racially motivated gerrymandering); Takahashi v. Fish &: Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410
(1948) (limitation of livelihood); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (limitation of
land ownership); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886) (limitation of livelihood). See
also Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33 (1915) (discrimination against aliens). But cf. Ex parte
Endo, 323 U.S. 283 (1944); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi
v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
Sterilization of "habitual criminals": Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
103 369 U.S. at 226.
104 Id. at 254.
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legislative apportionments are defective in this sense of failing to
supply any logically discernible standard. Apportionment formulas
which produce discriminations of this kind appear to be highly
vulnerable.
A second classification which may fall under the ban of equal
protection is that in which the class lines are dra"t-vn in a way
which is on its face rational, but which nonetheless proves on closer
examination to include within a single classification individual
members not like others in the same group, or fails to include
some that are like those in the group selected for favored or
disfavored treatment. This is the problem of over-inclusion and
under-inclusion. 105 These are not cases of forbidden classification,
strictly speaking, but instances in which the means selected are
defective. On the whole, the Court has not insisted upon rigorous
conformity to this standard in passing upon state action in regulation of economic interests. The presumption of constitutionality
has proved a convenient carpet under which to sweep irregularities of classification. But where the presumption of constitutionality is reversed, 106 as here suggested to be proper in franchise cases,
apportionments that result in gross disparities in the weighting of
votes will of course be difficult to justify.
A third classification is the one most clearly condemned by
the equal protection clause. This is legislative classification of
subject matter where there are no permissible bases for classification. The outstanding examples previously adjudicated are, of
course, classifications by race, now forbidden out of hand, and
classifications on grounds of alienage which, in some areas, such
as opportunity to earn a livelihood, are also beyond the reach of
a state's classificatory power.107
The developing significance of the equal protection clause as
a guardian of individual liberty has been demonstrated most com~
prehensively and dramatically in the gradual case-by-case erection
of a total barrier to state-approved racial discrimination. In the
early years following the adoption of the fourteenth amendment
See Tussman &: tenBroek, supra note 63.
See Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471, 477-78 (D. Colo. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885, 891 (W.D. Okla. 1962). Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
543-45 (1942) (Stone, C. J., concurring); Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal
Constitution, 27 LAW &: CoNTEIIIP. PROB. 329, 369 (1962); Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Courts, 71 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1057, 1086 (1958). See also text at notes
115-44 infra. But cf. W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp. 368, 373 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
101 See, e.g., Takahashi v. Fish &: Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Truax v. Raich,
239 U.S. 33 (1915). Cf. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
1011

100
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the Court saw little in the clause save a limitation on discrimination in the selection of jurors. Originally, even here, it was only
overt discrimination by statute or judicial participation in juror
selection that was condemned.108 By the middle of the twentieth
century forbidden discrimination was found, even apart from explicit exclusion on grounds of race, in long-standing patterns of
jury composition which did not in fact include N egroes. 100
The developing role of the equal protection clause in connection with segregation is similar. While the clause was being
used increasingly to strike down economic classifications, segregation was considered to be a rational classification so long as the
facilities provided, although "separate," were "equal." 110 Although the doctrine was not destined to survive, its demise was,
to say the least, lingering. Hints along the way, ever stronger,
were offered in 1917,111 1938,112 and 1950;113 :finally the turnabout
came in 1954.114 Now, however, there can be no mistaking that
any classification on grounds of race is forbidden.
The equal protection concept has had a similarly expansionist
history in relation to state action whose hostile thrust was aimed
at non-citizens because of the fact of alienage, as often further
distorted by racial bias as well. The earliest of these cases, and still
the doctrinal base for most that have followed, is Yick W o v.
Hopkins.11 5 The San Francisco ordinance involved in that case,
apparently fair on its face, required the licensing of all laundries
within the corporate limits of the city and county except those
built of brick or stone. Presumptively the ordinance was designed
as a police measure to reduce the hazard of fires in wooden, perhaps ramshackle, laundry structures. Yet the undisputed facts
were that, although permission to continue operation in wooden
buildings was denied to petitioners and 200 others, "all of whom
happen to be Chinese subjects, eighty others, not Chinese subjects,
are permitted to carry on the same business under similar conditions."116 Mr. Justice Matthews, writing for a unanimous Court,
108 Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370 (1881); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880);
Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1880).
109 See, e.g., Cassell v. Texas, 339 U.S. 282 (1950); Patton v. Mississippi, 332 U.S.
463 (1947); Akins v. Texas, 325 U.S. 398 (1945); Hill v. Texas, 316 U.S. 400 (1942).
110 Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
111 Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
112 Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938).
113 Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950).
114 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
115 118 U.S. 356 (1886).
116 Id. at 374.
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concluded that no reason for this unequal treatment existed
"except hostility to the race and nationality to which the petitioners belong, and which in the eye of the law is not justified." 117
In short, the facts provided vivid testimony of the administration
of a law, however fair on its face, "with a mind so unequal and
oppressive as to amount to a practical denial by the State of that
equal protection of the laws" which is secured by the fourteenth
amendment. 118 Two things about the case should be observed for
their relevance today. First, the Court looked at the pattern of
administration under the ordinance and unhesitatingly found in
that performance sufficient evidence of discriminatory purpose
to invoke equal protection. Second, upon a demonstration of the
fact of unequal administration of the ordinance, any presumptive
validity that might otherwise have attached disappeared; and the
failure of the city to offer justification apart from racial hostility
required invalidation of the ordinance.
A further matter of special interest about Yick Wo is a dictum
of great relevance to the current apportionment cases. Emphasizing that a person's right to earn a livelihood should not be held
"at the mere will of another," Mr. Justice Matthews analogized
from a related proposition which he apparently believed was beyond contest.
"There are many illustrations that might be given of this
truth, which would make manifest that it was self-evident in
the light of our system of jurisprudence. The case of the
political franchise of voting is one. Though not regarded
strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege merely conceded
by a society according to its will, under certain conditions,
nevertheless it is regarded as a fundamental political right,
because preservative of all rights." 119
Later cases have confirmed and strengthened the proposition
that state legislation which displays, on its face or in its administration, a hostility to aliens as a class is at least subject to "strict
scrutiny of the classification" 120 and, if racial hostility is present,
to the probability of invalidation. Truax v. Raich 121 involved an
attack upon an Arizona law which required all Arizona employers
of more than five workers to hire not less than eighty percent
117 Ibid.
118
110
120
121

Id. at 373.
Id. at 370.
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942).
239 U.S. 33 (1915).
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qualified electors or native-born citizens of the United States.
Raich, an alien who worked as a cook in a restaurant which had
more than five employees, was about to lose his job solely because
of the state law's coercive effect on his employer. The Court invalidated the law and declared that Raich, as a lawfully admitted
alien, had a federal privilege to enter and abide in any state and
thereafter a right to enjoy the equal protection of the laws where
he resided. Accordingly, the state could not restrict the right of
all lawfully resident aliens to engage in otherwise lawful employment. Although the Court conceded that in some respects the state
could treat aliens differently than citizens,122 special justification
was required in each such case. Here that burden had not been
met:
"[U]nderlying the classification is the authority to deal with
that at which the legislation is aimed. The restriction now
sought to be sustained is such as to suggest no limit to the
State's power of excluding aliens from employment if the
principle underlying the prohibition of the act is conceded."123
The most recent of the restriction-on-employment cases, Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n,124 held invalid a California statute barring issuance of commercial fishing licenses to persons
"ineligible to citizenship," a classification which included resident-alien Japanese and precluded such persons from earning a
living as commercial fishermen in the California coastal waters.
The Court held that the State of California had failed to show,
as required in Truax, a "special public interest with respect to
any particular business ... that could possibly be deemed to support the enactment ... .''125 Thus, Mr. Justice Black, for the majority, found it unnecessary to examine petitioner's contention
that the measure was enacted as a result of "racial antagonism
directed solely against the Japanese.'' 126 Mr. Justice Murphy, concurring, went further to develop at some length compelling evidence in support of the proposition that the statute was "designed
solely to discriminate against such persons in a manner incon122 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 138 (1914); Mccready v. Virginia, 94 U.S. 391
(1877). See also Ohio ex rel. Clarke v. Deckebach, 274 U.S. 392 (1927); Crane v. New York,
239 U.S. 195 (1915); Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 174 (1915).
123 Truax. v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 43.
124 334 U.S. 410 (1948).
125 Truax. v. Raich, 239 U.S. at 43.
126 334 U.S. at 418.
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sistent with the concept of equal protection of the laws. Legislation of that type is not entitled to wear the cloak of constitutionality."121
The other principal class of cases in which discrimination on
grounds of race or alienage is said to be involved relates to laws
restricting ownership or occupancy of land to citizens. The root
case was Terrace v. Thompson, 128 in which the Court upheld a
classification restricting ownership of land in the state of Washington to citizens and aliens eligible for citizenship who had in good
faith made the declaration of intent to become citizens required
by the naturalization laws. Truax v. Raich was distinguished, the
Court concluding that the requisite showing of the state's special
interest was sustained by the fact that "the quality and allegiance
of those who own, occupy and use the farmlands within its borders
are matters of highest importance and affect the safety and power
of the State itself." 129 That case, however, was sharply limited in
Oyama v. California 130 and Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n.
The California Alien Land Law construed in Oyama in effect
forbade aliens ineligible for American citizenship to acquire, own,
occupy, lease, or transfer agricultural land. In a proceeding by the
state to escheat two parcels of land said to have been acquired in
violation of the statute, the Court recognized the potentiality for
discrimination in the statute and that such discrimination could be
sustained only if there was "compelling justification."131 But under
the facts no justification was shown where the escheat, if permitted,
would take away land recorded in the name of an American citizen,
a minor, solely because the land had been paid for by his father,
a Japanese alien ineligible for naturalization. So the Court could
only conclude that "the discrimination is based solely on his
parents' country of origin .... " 132 Although Terrace v. Thompson was not specifically overruled, state courts have interpreted the
later decisions in Oyama and Takahashi as repudiating the doctrine that ownership of land could be limited to citizens and aliens
eligible for citizenship.133
Id. at 422.
263 U.S. 197 (1923). See also Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326 (1923); Webb v. O'Brien,
2G3 U.S. 313 (1923); Porterfield v. Webb, 263 U.S. 225 (1923).
120 263 U.S. at 221.
130 332 U.S. 633 (1948). Four members of the Court would have overruled Terrace
v. Thompson outright. Id. at 649, 672.
131 332 U.S. at 640.
132 Ibid.
133 See Sei Fujii v. California, 38 Cal. 2d 718, 242 P.2d 617 (1952); Namba v. Mccourt,
185 Ore. 579, 204 P.2d 569 (1949),
121
128
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Skinner v. 0 klahoma 134 involved a very different kind of situation, but again one in which the Court recognized that legislation
is on its face suspect when it involves limitation on "one of the
basic civil rights of man," 135 and is accordingly subject to "strict
scrutiny." 136 At issue was the validity of Oklahoma's Habitual
Criminal Sterilization Act, which defined habitual criminals to include any person convicted two or more times of felonies involving
moral turpitude and thereafter convicted and sentenced in Oklahoma for such a crime. Although this definition included larceny,
embezzlement was specifically exempted by statute, and in this the
Court found "a clear, pointed, unmistakable discrimination. Oklahoma makes no attempt to say that he who commits larceny by
trespass or trick or fraud has biologically inheritable traits which
he who commits embezzlement lacks." 137 One may doubt whether
any classification would survive which contemplated sterilization
of some habitual criminals but not of others,1 38 but the Court was
not required to reach that ultimate proposition where, as in this
case,
"We have not the slightest basis for inferring that that line
[between larceny by fraud and embezzlement] has any significance in eugenics, nor that the inheritability of criminal
traits follows the neat legal distinctions which the law has
marked between these two offenses." 139
In 1956 still another facet of equal protection was uncovered.
In Griffin v. Illinois140 the Court ruled that in a criminal case a
state may not administer its law "so as to deny adequate appellate
review to the poor while granting such review to all others."141
That case involved the furnishing without cost to an indigent
defendant of the transcript of the trial proceedings necessary under state law for appellate review; failure to make provision for
such transcript was held, interestingly enough, to violate both
due process and equal protection. Since that time comparable state
practices have been found similarly vulnerable in a series of cases
expounding the basic proposition announced in Griffin, and
134 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
135 Id. at 541.
136 Ibid.
137 Ibid.
138 But cf. Buck v. Bell,
139 316 U.S. at 542.
140 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
141 Id. at 13.

274 U.S. 200 (1927).
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making clear that its reach was retroactive as well as prospective.142
Principal reliance on equal protection seems also to follow from
the later cases. In Burns v. Ohio,143 for example, Mr. Chief Justice
Warren stated that "the imposition by the State of financial barriers restricting the availability of appellate review for indigent
criminal defendants has no place in our heritage of Equal Justice
Under Law."
While it may seem that there is little logical identity among
the matters thus far discussed, freedom from discrimination on
grounds of race or alienage, the right to have offspring, the right
to an appeal in a criminal case free of the handicap of poverty,
and the right not to have one's vote diluted by malapportionment,
yet there is also a strong kinship in each as "one of the basic civil
rights of man." In this is found the rationalizing principle in explanation of the two sides of equal protection. Where the matter
subject to regulation is economic in nature or pertains to social welfare, the presumption of constitutionality will outride all but the
most exigent claims of legislative discrimination. But where the
preferred freedoms are involved, upon challenge the presumption
is reversed; and the state's rationale for any unequal treatment,
subjected to "strict scrutiny," will be sustained only upon a
showing of "compelling justification."
There can scarcely be doubt that the right of franchise is one
of those basic rights. As the Court long ago stated in Yick Wo v.
H ophins, the political franchise "is regarded as a fundamental
political right, because preservative of all rights." 144

C. Equal Protection: A Contemporary Meaning
With the decisions in Brown and Baher the libertarian side of
the equal protection clause has fully matured. As a shield against
limitation of individual liberties at the hands of state governments,
it must be ranked second in importance only to the due process
clause; and of course the close relationship between the two is
very marked.14 5 Neither clause any longer has much to say about
1-12 Smith v. Bennett, 365 U.S. 708 (1961); McCrary v. Indiana, 364 U.S. 277 (1960);
Douglas v. Green, 363 U.S. 192 (1960); Bums v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959); Ross v.
Schneckloth, 357 U.S. 575 (1958); Eskridge v. Washington State Prison Bd., 357 U.S. 214
(1958).
143 360 U.S. 252, 258 (1959).
144 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886).
14G For example, the possibility has been noted that, to the extent that the equal
protection clause of its own force prohibits discrimination in the selection of jurors,
such discrimination would mean that any resulting trial would violate due process. Fay
v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 284 n.27 (1947). See also Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 13
(1956).
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the state's power to regulate economic activities, even in almost
irrational ways, so long as any mischief could be imagined on
which the legislative policy might be thought to bear. On the other
hand, both clauses are strongly partisan in their interest in protecting the preferred freedoms relating to individual liberty. The
due process clause sometimes speaks through portions of the Bill
of Rights and sometimes of its own force, while the equal protection clause speaks always in its own name, to forbid segregation, to require equality in rights of appeal in criminal cases, to
limit eugenic experiments in limitation of the right of procreation-and now, to forbid irrational arrangements of voters into
election districts. On the basis of this analysis the applicability of
the equal protection clause to voting discriminations is perfectly
apparent, indeed cries out for application, if only exercise of the
right of franchise is recognized as a "basic civil right of man."
0£ this there can surely be no doubt. In a constitutional democracy, where the power of decision is vested in representative
government, the right of franchise is all-important. The individual member of the body politic has no opportunity to participate
in the governing process except through the ballot. This simple
truth has always been recognized by the Supreme Court in the
context of challenges to the power of Congress to protect the
integrity of the ballot for members of Congress. In United States
v. Classic146 the Court recognized the importance of the right of
franchise in these terms: "The right of the people to choose ...
is a right established and guaranteed by the Constitution and
hence is one secured by it to those citizens and inhabitants of
the state entitled to exercise the right." 147 This means that Congress may protect against intimidation of voters,148 failure to count
votes honestly,149 and ballot-box stuffing.150 So important is the
free exercise of the right of franchise at all relevant stages of the
election process that the party primary has also been included
within the above enumeration of protections surrounding the
election itself, as well as within the protection of the fifteenth
amendment,151 and presumably the fourteenth to the extent that
313 U.S. 299 (1941).
Id. at 314.
148 Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651 (1884).
149 United States v. Mosley, 238 U.S. 383 (1915).
150 United States v. Saylor, 322 U.S. 385 (1944); Ex parte Siebold, 100 U.S. 371 (1880).
151 Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 (1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944);
United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941).
146
147
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the equal protection clause is a guarantor against discrimination
in the free exercise of the ballot.
Presumably, then, it is not anywhere denied that the right
to vote is a fundamental right deserving of whatever special protections are afforded by the Constitution. The at-best faint denial
of this proposition is advanced on the ground that, whatever
the importance of these rights, they are subject to "reasonable"
classifications, and that the Supreme Court has so held in two
principal cases, MacDougall v. Green152 and South v. Peters,153
and several related cases more or less dependent on the same princi ple.1u4
The first thing that should be said is that detractors from
judicial intervention in behalf of equalizing state legislative districts cannot have it both ways. These cases, plus the ubiquitous
Colegrove v. Green, have sometimes been cited for the proposition that federal courts should not entertain actions for declaratory or injunctive relief against claimed malapportionment in
state or congressional election districts. 155 To use some or all of
the same cases for a holding that the equal protection clause does
not forbid the districting at issue is to ask too much of judicial
pronouncement. Putting aside this somewhat querulous point,
however, something should be said at least of MacDougall v.
Green and South v. Peters.
MacDougall is not apposite. The object of the action in that
case was to enjoin enforcement of an Illinois law requiring that
a petition to form, and to nominate candidates for, a new political
party be signed by at least 25,000 qualified voters, including at
least 200 from each of at least fifty counties within the state. Two
sentences of the Court's per curiam opinion have been read to
deny the applicability of equal protection concepts to apportionment generally. They are:
"To assume that political power is a function exclusively
of numbers is to disregard the practicalities of government
. . . . It would be strange indeed, and doctrinaire, for this
Court, applying such broad constitutional concepts as due
process and equal protection of the laws, to deny a State the
152

335 U.S. 281 (1948).
339 U.S. 276 (1950).
See Hartsfield v. Sloan, 357 U.S. 916 (1958); Radford v. Gary, 352 U.S. 991 (1957);
Kidd v. McCanless, 352 U.S. 920 (1956); Anderson v. Jordan, 343 U.S. 912 (1952); Remmey
v. Smith, 342 U.S. 916 (1952); Cox v. Peters, 342 U.S. 936, rehearing denied, 343 U.S. 921
(1952); Colegrove v. Barrett, 330 U.S. 804 (1947).
155 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 277-80 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
163
164
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power to assure a proper diffusion of political initiative as
between its thinly populated counties and those having concentrated masses, in view of the fact that the latter have
practical opportunities for exerting their political weight at
the polls not available to the former." 156
Putting aside the fact that this case, unlike Baker, involved a congressional election, which in truth seems not a very important
distinction,1 57 the real difference inheres in the purpose which the
Illinois statute was intended to serve. However wise or unwise
the legislation, its aim was simply to insure that any political party,
as a condition of initial access to the ballot, should have at least a
minimal base of support (200 signatures) in at least fifty counties
(fewer than half) in the state. It is quite a different thing to permit disproportionate weighting of. the votes of qualified voters
in every primary and general election, to the continuing advantage
of some and the continuing disadvantage of others. To say that
the state is not obligated to allow every aspiring political party,
including irresponsible ones, to participate in the official election
process is very different from saying that it has no obligation to
treat all registered voters equally. The quoted portions of the
MacDougall opinion, however valid in the context of that case,
should not be carried over as dictum to influence future decisions
involving the very different question of malapportionment.
Nor should South v. Peters be relied on as precedent in support
of continued malapportionment. Although the Court there refused to set aside the so-called county unit system in Georgia,
despite severe population disparities in the representation formula,158 the _two-paragraph per curiam opinion is not reasoned;
and, brief though it is, it is so ambiguous on the question here
relevant that it is not clear what the holding is. The three-judge
district court had dismissed the petition, presumably on the
merits,159 so the Supreme Court's affirmance can be read as a decision on the merits. However, the only reason given was that "federal courts consistently refuse to exercise their equity powers in
cases posing political issues arising from a state's geographical dis335 U.S. at 283-84.
See Black, Inequities in Districting for Congress: Baker v. Carr and Colegrove v.
Green, 72 YALE L.J. 13 (1962); Comment, Challenges to Congressional Districting: After
Baker v. Carr Does Colegrove v. Green Endure?, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 98 (1963).
158 Cf. Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated and remanded, 31
U.S.L. WEEK 4285 (U.S. March 18, 1963).
159 South v. Peters, 89 F. Supp. 672 (N.D. Ga. 1950).
156
157
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tribution of electoral strength among its political subdivisions."160
This is scarcely the language of decision on the merits, but rather
of withdrawal from decision on equitable grounds. The uncertainty
of meaning is further compounded by the fact that, of the three
Supreme Court decisions cited in presumed support of the abovementioned statement, one was a decision on the merits (MacDougall v. Green), but on a different matter, as already noted; one was
a decision distinctly not on the merits (Colegrove v. Green); and
the third involved interpretation of an act of Congress (Wood v.
Broom 161 ). Now that the Court has decided in Baker that questions
such as those presented in South v. Peters are justiciable and
should be decided on the merits, those cases should come to the
Court unembarrassed by the uncertainties of South v. Peters.
IV.

EQUAL PROTECTION AND REAPPORTIONMENT

The thesis has been offered previously that the modern, libertarian interpretation of equal protection when fundamental human
rights are involved should prove adequate to the task yet to be
accomplished of defining the standards by which equal protection
is to be applied to reapportionment. The forum for testing this
question is, and will continue to be, as the Supreme Court intended, in state and lower federal courts; and considerable wisdom emerges from their separate encounters with the almost infinite variety of individual apportionment formulas.

A. The Impermissible Classifications
There can no longer be doubt that equal protection is sometimes to be read with the imperatives of an absolute, altogether
forbidding some grounds of classification. Race is, of course, the
clearest example, and religion would presumably be another if
the first amendment were not available to serve the same function
directly of its o·wn force. The argument is strongly pressed that
the weighting of votes by apportionment-induced inequities should
also be categorically forbidden. It is a forceful argument, stemming from the democratic premise of guaranteed equality in the
exercise of the franchise. The hypothesis is certainly no less compelling, and perhaps more so, in light of the representative character of the government prescribed by the American Constitution.
The constant movement in American democracy has been away
100
101

339 U.S. at 277.
287 U.S. I, 8 (1932).
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from the early restrictions on the right of suffrage. Qualifications
on the right of franchise based on property ownership and on sex
have disappeared, as has the original practice of indirect election
of Senators, and as have most other impediments to free exercise
of the ballot. The nearly complete triumph of the democratic ideal
in these respects is scarcely flawed save by persistent, and worsening, disadvantages imposed on some groups of voters occasioned
solely by the fact of residence at one place within a state rather than
another. 162
The democratic equalitarian argument against voter classification other than on the basis of population is extremely attractive
and has gained considerable support under the banner of "one
man-one vote." 163 Supporters of the principle of representation in
accordance with population make it clear that they intend application of that standard to both houses of every bicameral state legislature, 164 but would ordinarily allow some flexibility where precise
mathematical equality is not feasible except at the expense of other
distortion, such as gerrymandering. 165 Conceptually appealing
as this position is, it is striking that at least in this absolute form
it has attracted almost no judicial support. None of the Supreme
Court opinions in Baker endorsed the proposition that all weighting is forbidden. Although the majority opinion does not deal
explicitly with the question, the concurring and dissenting opinions demonstrate that the problem of standards had been much
thought about. Mr. Justice Douglas, concurring, came closest to
the "one man-one vote" proposition when he said that "the question is, may a State weight the vote of one county or one district
more heavily than it weights the vote in another?" 166 As phrased,
a negative answer might have been anticipated. However, invoking
the test of "invidious discrimination," he continued: "Universal
equality is not the test; there is room for weighting." 167 Mr. Justice
Clark was equally explicit in stating that "no one . . . contends
162 It is no answ·er to suggest that the voter discrimination among state districts is
similar to that against voters of different states in voting for senators. Reasons will be
advanced infra for the proposition that the so-called "federal analogy" is in reality not
relevant at all.
163 Under that title, The Twentieth Century Fund in 1962 published a statement of
the consensus of a conference of political scientists, research scholars, and others with
particular experience and interest in apportionment. The te."t was prepared by Mr.
Anthony Lewis, who served as reporter.
164 See statement referred to in note 163 supra, at 8-12.
165 See Israel, On Charting a Course Through the Mathematical Quagmire: The
Future of Baker v. Carr, 61 Mica. L. R.Ev. 107, 114-24 (1962).
166 369 U.S. at 244.
167 Id. at 244-45.
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that mathematical equality among voters is required by the Equal
Protection Clause." 168 Mr. Justice Stewart, concurring, rejected
the concept of absolute, or even approximate, equality. 169 And of
course Justices Frankfurter and Harlan, in their dissenting opinions, denied that the equal protection clause carries such a command. Indeed, Mr. Justice Frankfurter asserted that the Court
"shrinks from asserting that in districting at least substantial
equality is a constitutional requirement enforceable by courts."170
While he probably underestimated the consensus of the majority
toward remedial action in cases of severe disparity, certainly no
voice has yet been heard on the Supreme Court in favor of full
equality of population in all state voting districts.
In state and lower federal courts the answer has not been different on this point, even though very substantial reordering of
state legislative apportionment was effectuated before the N ovember 1962 general election, the first after the decision in Baker.
By the end of 1962 reapportionment in both houses of a bicameral
legislature in accordance with population had been ordered by
state or federal courts in five states; but in no one of them did the
court rule categorically that mathematical equality of population
was required for each election district (even permitting minor
variations as a practical matter).
The decision which looks most strongly in the direction of
near-mathematical equality in both houses is Scholle v. Hare,17 1
in which the majority of the Michigan Supreme Court held invalid
provisions of the 1952 amendments to the state constitution creating senatorial voting districts that were "arbitrary, discriminatory,
and without reasonable or just relation or relevance to the electoral process."172 Justice Kavanagh, for himself and Justice Black,
suggested a rule in these terms:
"When a legislative apportionment provides districts having
more than double the population of others, the constitutional
range of discretion is violated. This is not to say that less than
such 2 to I ratio is constitutionally good. It is to say only
that peril ends and disaster occurs when that line is crossed." 173
Id. at 258.
Id. at 265-66.
170 Id. at 268-69.
171 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), petition for certiorari filed sub nom. Beadle
v. Scholle, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517).
172 Id. at 186, 116 N.W.2d at 354.
173 Id. at 188-89, 116 N.W.2d at 355.
108
100
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In the same case, without suggesting possible limits of permissible
variation, Justice Souris, for himself and Justice Smith, made a
strong plea for population-based election districts:
"Beyond the objective of affording to citizens effective representation in the legislature, it is difficult for me to conceive
of any other legitimate State purpose for classification of citizens in their participation in the electoral process, a process
inherently the equal right of each individual citizen." 174
The latter formulation is weakened, not only by the fact that the
statement was made for only two of the seven participating justices,
but as well since stated in general terms; and Justice Souris himself admits the possibility, however unlikely, that there might be
"other legitimate objectives of classification which would constitutionally justify State denial of the Citizen's right to a free and
undiluted ballot . . . ."175 Justice Kavanagh, on the other hand,
proposed a specific enough formula, but also spoke for only two
justices. In addition, although his remarks have been widely
quoted both by supporters and detractors of the equal-population
principle, too little notice has been given to the fact that the principle was drawn from earlier Michigan cases176 dealing primarily
with state constitutional questions, and from a dissenting opinion
in the United States Supreme Court.177 No member of the Michigan Supreme Court held invalid the provisions of the 1908 state
constitution which would become operative on invalidation of the
1952 amendments. But those provisions178 forbid division of counties in fixing the senatorial districts except where a single county
is entitled on the basis of population to two or more senators.
Under such restrictions only the most approximate equality would
be possible, probably not even within the two-to-one limits mandated by Justice Kavanagh.
Moreover, the statements quoted above from the majority
opinion in Scholle v. Hare may be no more than strong dictum.
The case was apparently decided on the ground that the long
failure of effective reapportionment in the state senate had deId. at 243, 116 N.W.2d at 381.
Id. at 243, 116 N.W.2d at 381-82.
Williams v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich. 447, 108 N.W. 749 (1906); Giddings
v. Secretary of State, 93 Mich. I, 52 N.W. 944 (1892).
177 In MacDougall v. Green, 335 U.S. 281, 288 (1948), Justices Douglas, Black, and
Murphy, in dissenting, stated: "None would deny that a state law giving some citizens
twice the vote of other citizens in either the primary or general election would lack the
equality which the Fourteenth Amendment guarantees."
178 MICH. CONST. art. 5, §§ 2, 4.
174
175
176
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prived the constitutionally prescribed districts of all rationality,
as was the situation in Baker, a matter discussed later. 179 The
Michigan case can be described as a general endorsement of the
equal-population principle, but probably not as an explicit holding
to that effect.
However far the decision in the Michigan case may be thought
to go in support of the equal-population principle, courts which
sweepingly invalidated existing apportionments in other states
gave more modest reasons for their action. In Baker v. Carr, the
defendants conceded before the three-judge district court on remand of the case that the still-controlling 1901 act (the legislature
having failed to reapportion in the meanwhile) "fell far short of
the standards of the equal protection clause."180 The court had
for decision then only the validity of the reapportionment statute
enacted at the extraordinary session of the legislature convened
in 1962. But the court was critical of the new plan for both houses,
particularly the proposal for the senate which was characterized as
"inexplicable either in terms of geography or demography.'' 181
The total lack of rationality was demonstrated in that "not only
are there wide discrepancies between rural areas of comparable
character but disparities also exist as between urban areas." 182
In short, the Tennessee plan remained a "crazy quilt" without
rational foundation, void under even the most undemanding standard of equal protection. However, a "rational" plan, even one permitting unequal representation, was not forbidden: "We find no
basis for holding that the Fourteenth Amendment precludes a
state from enforcing a policy which would give a measure of protection and recognition to its less populous governmental units." 183
In the Virginia case, Mann v. Davis,184 the three-judge court
concluded that implementation of the 1962 apportionment act
should be enjoined as to both houses of the General Assembly.
170 See also Brief in Opposition to Petition for Certiorari, pp. 8-14, Beadle v. Scholle,
31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517).
180 Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 345 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
181 Id. at 347.
1s2 Ibid.
183 Id. at 346.
184 Civil No. 2604, E.D. Va., Nov. 28, 1962. The injunction against proceeding under
the 1962 acts was stayed until January 31, 1963, to permit convening the legislature or
appeal to the Supreme Court. This action was further stayed by Mr. Chief Justice Warren
on December 15, 1962, presumably on the ground that the legislature should not be
required to act prematurely, without an opportunity for defendant state officials to be
heard before the Supreme Court. Appeal was filed with the Supreme Court on Feb. 2,
1963. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3284 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1963) (No. 797).
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Yet the possibility of legislative consideration of other factors was
acknowledged.
"While predominant, population is not in our opinion the
sole or definitive measure of districts when taken by the Equal
Protection Clause. Compactness and contiguity of the territory, community of interests of the people, observance of
natural lines, and conformity to historical divisions, such as
county lines, for example, are all to be noticed in assaying the
justness of the apportionment."185
Three-judge courts in Alabama186 and Oklahoma187 invalidated
apportionments in both houses of each state, but without squarely
holding in either case that the equal-population principle must
be satisfied in both houses. In the Alabama case, Sims v. Frink,
the court suggested only that "representation according to population to some extent must be required in both Houses if invidious
discrimination in the legislative systems as a whole is to be
avoided."188 But the cryptic words "to some extent" were not
defined. In the Oklahoma case, Moss v. Burkhart, the court concluded that unconstitutionality could not be demonstrated "by
merely showing a disparity in voting strength of the various electoral districts," 189 although "a disparity of ten to one in the voting
strength between electoral districts makes out a prima fade case
for invidious discrimination, and calls for strict justification."100
As will more particularly appear below, other courts have
rejected, in varying degrees, the equal-population principle as a
necessary postulate in both houses. Some have said that representation in at least one house must be closely related to population, 101 while others have suggested that population is but one factor-albeit primary-of several that may permissibly be taken into
account,192 and a few have concluded that the legislature is largely
Id. at 10.
Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962).
Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962).
208 F. Supp. at 439.
207 F. Supp. at 891.
Ibid.
See Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F.
Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962); Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (per curiam),
explanation of per curiam order, 184 A.2d 715 (1962); Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116
N.W.2d 350 (1962).
192 See Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471, 476, 478 (D. Colo. 1962) (semble)
[cf. In the Matter of Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962)); Sobel v.
Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316, 321-22 (S.D. Fla. 1962); W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 208 F. Supp.
368, 374-80 (S.D.N.Y. 1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296, 301 (R.I. 1962); Baker v. Carr,
206 F. Supp. 341, 349 (M.D. Tenn. 1962).
185
186
187
188
189
190
191
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free to select whatever factors it chooses in the composition of
election districts, so long as they are "rational." 193 A number of
courts, regardless of their views on standards, have retained jurisdiction pending anticipated legislative action, meanwhile offering
cautious advice as to what might be disapproved and, still more
tentatively, even as to what might be approved. 194
B. "Crazy-Quilt" Inequality

In the absence of some guidance from the Supreme Court
as to appropriate standards in relation to state legislative apportionment, it should scarcely be expected that a state or lower
federal court would unhesitatingly demand compliance with a
relatively rigid equal-population principle to be made applicable
at once in both houses of a state legislature that has historically
operated from a different base. The law simply does not develop
new areas so boldly, but moves more tentatively and exploringly,
endeavoring meanwhile to insure community acceptance of the
law's seeming demands. Such has been the experience following
Baker v. Carr. As revealed in the preceding subsection, courts
confronted with apportionment problems have uniformly accepted
jurisdiction and acknowledged the obligation of decision. In
some cases decision was easy because gross malapportionment was
apparent or perhaps not even denied. But more often the courts
retained jurisdiction pending opportunity for corrective action
without necessity of judicial intervention. The cautious prodding
of legislative action by the Vermont Supreme Court is representative: "The legislative branch has, as yet, failed to act. So long as
time remains for performance, we cannot presume that once their
duty has been called to their attention they will fail to carry it
out." 195 However, as the Wisconsin Supreme Court warned, "if
the legislature neglects or refuses to make a fair, equitable and
constitutional apportionment within a reasonable time after the
1963 legislature has been in session, then plaintiffs or others should
193 Caesar v. Williams, 371 P.2d 241 (Idaho 1962) (one senator for each county and
at least one representative for each county); Levitt v. Maynard, 104 N.H. 243, 182 A.2d 897
(1962); Levitt v. Attorney General, 104 N.H. 100, 179 A.2d 286 (1962).
104 In the Matter of Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962); Sincock
v. Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205, motion to dismiss denied, 210 F. Supp. 395, 396 (D. Del. 1962);
League of Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962); Lein v. Sathre, 205
F. Supp. 536 (D.N.D. 1962); Mikell v. Rousseau, 183 A.2d 817 (Vt. 1962); Wisconsin v.
Zimmerman, 205 F. Supp. 673, dismissed without prejudice, 209 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Wis.
1962).
19G Mikell v. Rousseau, supra note 194, at 823.
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not be prejudiced or prevented, by the decision in this case, from
appealing to a federal court for redress." 196
The truth is, and it is not unsurprising, that without explicit
Supreme Court guidance the courts to which these matters have
been presented have acted promptly and with considerable boldness to eliminate some of the most virulent forms of malapportionment. The easiest cases have been those, like Baker itself, in which
the apportionments were "crazy quilts" without benefit of any
defensible plan, rational or otherwise. Mr. Justice Clark demonstrated effectively that, no matter how the apportionment in that
case was examined, inequities appeared on the basis of any comparison that could be made. 197 Not only were urban areas in
general disadvantaged, but as well there were sharp inequalities
even among rural counties of similar population and among urban
counties of nearly equal size. The reason is not hard to find. Take
an unequal apportionment fixed by statute in 1901, as was the
case in Tennessee, quadruple the voting population over sixty
years, and tilt the population balance from rural to urban while
leaving the apportionment unchanged. Perhaps worst of all, the
resulting malapportionment cements control of the very processes
of change in the hands of those who have most to lose-often
their very political life-from any change. It is hardly surprising
that the courts should intervene to protect the integrity of the
political process.
This is, of course, exactly what has happened. Courts troubled
by the apparent rigidities of the equal-population principle have
often used as a more convenient handle the kind of gross disparities
described above, continually compounded by population shifts,
and often uncorrectible unless by judicial action. By the time
Baker came back to the three-judge district court on remand, the
defendants had conceded the invalidity of the 1901 statute, and
the legislature had enacted new laws. But the court concluded that
the "crazy quilt" inequities were still present and so in effect sent
the matter back once more for legislative correction, meanwhile
retaining jurisdiction.198 Similar aggravations to worsen malapportionment occur in a number of other states where legislative
districts are prescribed by state constitution without provision for
change with population shifts, and where state legislatures have
failed to reapportion, often in violation of state constitutional obli196
197
198

Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183, 188 (W.D. Wis. 1962).
369 U.S. at 253-64.
Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 349-51 (M:.D. Tenn. 1962).
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gation. These are the clearest, and perhaps the most devastatingly
dangerous, forms of malapportionment. Even where there might
once have been a rational-even an equal-population-basis for
apportionment, but which has been outdated by population
shifts, no semblance of rationality remains. Invocation of the equal
protection clause as a corrective in at least these cases, and they
are numerous, 199 is an imperative hard to refuse. If Baker v. Carr
should at last come to no more than a righting of these egregious
·wrongs, it would have served well. The prospects are, however,
that it will mean more, that the equal protection ideal will prove
hardy enough to strike down further apportionment excesses, as
suggested subsequently.

C. The Equal-Population Principle and the "Federal Analogy"
The applicability of the equal protection clause to the totally
irrational inequities described above is apparent. Another consequence of Baker, perhaps less obvious, is the near unanimity with
which courts have concluded that population must be the sole,
or at least the strongly dominant, factor in fixing election districts
in at least one house of a bicameral state legislature.200 This development is greatly significant both as a practical matter and from a
conceptual standpoint.
If the proposition gains general acceptance, as apparently it
has, that equal protection requires that the election districts for
at least one house of a bicameral legislature be fixed in accordance
with the equal-population principle, adjustment will be necessary
(or has already been made) in the dozen or more states in which
before 1962 neither house of the legislature was apportioned on a
predominantly population base.201 In response to litigation ini100 Sims v. Frink, 208 F. Supp. 431 (M.D. Ala. 1962); Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp.
316 (S.D. Fla. 1962); Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962) [for later history,
see note 158 supra]; Scholle v. Hare, 367 Mich. 167, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962); League of
Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962); Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp.
885 (\V.D. Okla. 1962); Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962); Mikell v. Rousseau,
183 A.2d 817 (Vt. 1962); Mann v. Davis, Civil No. 2604, E.D. Va., Nov. 28, 1962; Wisconsin
v. Zimmerman, 209 F. Supp. 183 (W.D. Wis. 1962).
200 Sims v. Frink, supra note 199 (both houses); Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471
(D. Colo. 1962); Sincock v. Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205 (D. Del. 1962) (semble); Sobel v. Adams,
supra note 199; Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248, 257 (N.D. Ga. 1962); Maryland
Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 184 A.2d 715, 718-21 (Md. 1962); Scholle v.
Hare, supra note 199 (both houses); League of Municipalities v. Marsh, supra note 199
(unicameral); Moss v. Burkhart, supra note 199 (both houses); Sweeney v. Notte, supra
note 199; Baker v. Carr, 206 F. Supp. 341, 349 (M.D. Tenn. 1962); Mikell v. Rousseau,
supra note 199; Mann v. Davis, supra note 199 (both houses); Wisconsin v. Zimmerman,
supra note 199 (semble).
201 Bow, PATIERNS OF APPORTIONMENT 3 (National Municipal League pamphlet 1962);
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tiated in state and lower federal courts after the decision in Baker,
several state legislatures began the corrective process in 1962,
and others will act in 1963, including several in which courts retained jurisdiction over suits alleging invalid standards until legislative correction could be sought.202
An important aspect of the developing consensus in favor of
apportioning at least one house on a strict population basis is
the remarkable fact that state and lower federal courts could so
soon reach agreement on this minimum requirement of equal
protection, an agreement reached despite absence of any Supreme
Court guidance on the subject. Even as a preliminary decision,
however, the matter is not free of difficulty. It is one thing to
say that the democratic-equalitarian aspirations voiced by the equal
protection clause necessitate a strict population formula in one
house. But it is quite another thing to justify what some courts
have accepted as a corollary proposition, that population need not
be a factor at all in the second house. For a few it has been sufficient
to cite the so-called "federal analogy" and say, as did Mr. Justice
Harlan, dissenting in Baker:
"It is surely beyond argument that those who have the responsibility for devising a system of representation may permissibly consider that factors other than bare numbers should
be taken into account. The existence of the United States
Senate is proof enough of that." 203
But the answer is not that simple. The claimed analogy between
the representation formula in Congress and in the states does not
withstand analysis, whether examined from the standpoint of
history, constitutional command, or logic.204
Thomas Jefferson, ·writing in 1816, stated with characteristic
eloquence the democratic ideal of fairness in political representation when he said: "For let it be agreed that a government is
republican in proportion as every member composing it has his
Goldberg, The Statistics of Reapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 90, 91 app. A (1962). See also
NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM ON LEGISLATIVE .APPORTIONMENT (1962).
202 Changes in apportionment to provide additional weight to population were
effected by legislative act in 1962 in the following states: Alabama, Delaware, Florida
(later invalidated), Georgia (later invalidated), Maryland (house only), Mississippi (but
voted down), Tennessee (later invalidated), Vermont, and "Wisconsin (governor vetoed).
Rh}'ne, The Death Knell of Minority Government 3 (mimeographed speech delivered
at New York University, Nov. 17, 1962).
203 369 U.S. at 333.
204 For a more complete analysis, see McKAY, REAPPORTIONMENT AND THE FEDERAL
ANALOGY (National Municipal League pamphlet 1962).
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equal voice in the direction of its concerns ... by representatives
chosen by himself. . . ." 205 In so speaking he was emphasizing
anew the equalitarian principle that had been emphatically asserted in the Declaration of Independence and at the Constitutional Convention in 1787. Although in the Constitution itself
the principle of equal representation was rejected in the Senate,
it is important to realize the reasons for that result. Indeed, the
principle of representation proportional to population in both
houses won out in the original voting in the Constitutional Convention, when the Virginia Plan was under consideration.206 Soon
enough, however, it became obvious that the smaller states would
demand a larger voice in the Congress than population alone
would justify. It was clear that if any government acceptable to
a large enough number of states was to be agreed upon, a different formula must be worked out for at least one house. And
so was born the "Great Compromise"207 whereby population would
be the primary factor in the apportionment of representatives in
the House, while population should be entirely disregarded in the
allocation of two Senators to each state.
Whether the final solution was less desirable than the earlier
proposal by which population would have determined representation in both houses is not here the point. The political situation
in 1787, particularly the tenuous authority of the Constitutional
Convention even to propose a wholly new Constitution, made it
clear that no change from the Articles of Confederation could be
effected without the concurrence of all, or substantially all, of the
sovereign states. The most important factor to be weighed in
effecting a compromise ultimately acceptable to all was of course
the fact that the existing states were all conceived to be sovereign
and independent. Nor did the proposed Constitution contemplate
any change in the retained sovereignty (soon to be further assured
by the tenth amendment). Rather it was a consensual union of
sovereign states by which they agreed to relinquish to the national
government only those enumerated powers thought essential to
the successful functioning of a national government, but reserving
all powers not given over. And of course there was no power external to the Constitution itself which could on any basis be urged
as requiring adoption of the equal-population principle in both
houses of Congress.
205 Letter to Samuel Kercheval, 10 WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 38 (Ford ed. 1899).
Sec also letter to John Taylor, id. at 29, 31; letter to Baron von Humboldt, id. at 89.
206 FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 74-75 (1913).
201 Id. at 105.
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Individual states, in devising their own legislative structures,
are very differently situated. Where the national government was
founded by the states and was thus their creature, the relationship
between the states and their political subdivisions is exactly the
opposite. The local governmental units, the counties, cities, towns,
and villages, were created by or under the authority of the state in
which located. In the absence of any claim of sovereignty, such
local units can be enlarged, reduced, or even eliminated at the
almost uncontrolled discretion of the parent state. Congress of
course has no such freedom to alter state boundaries. Typical, if
somewhat too sweeping, generalization of the extent of state power
over local governmental units is the Court's statement in Hunter
v. City of Pittsburgh: 208 "The number, nature and duration of
the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory
over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion
of the state." Even the unstated exception to the Court's allembracing assertion is instructive. The freedom to rearrange
political subdivisions does not extend to cases in which the state
legislative action intrudes upon specific constitutional prohibitions
such as that in the fifteenth amendment against depriving a citizen
of his vote because of race. 209 Similarly, it is perfectly plain that
the fourteenth amendment's proscriptions, to the extent relevant,
are equally applicable as limitations on state action. Accordingly,
once it is made clear that state legislative apportionment is to be
tested against the standard of equal protection, there can be no
claim of analogy in the congressional system of apportionment,
prescribed as it is by the Constitution itself as part of a reluctant
but necessary compromise.

D. The Equal-Population Principle and the Second House
in State Legislatures
Unfortunately, rejection of the "federal analogy" does not
solve all the problems that arise in seeking to apply the equalpopulation principle to state legislative apportionment. An alternative formula must still be sought within the logical confines of
the idea of equality in political representation. Conceptually,
much the neatest solution would be to conclude that if equal
protection requires equality of representation in one house of a
bicameral legislature, it should also require equality of representa2os 207 U.S. 161, 178 (1907).
209 Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).

1963]

REAPPORTIONMENT AL'lD EQUAL PROTECTION

693.

tion in the other house. There is more to be said in support of such
a conclusion than the neatly logical, but sometimes barren, rule
of symmetry. If dilution of the vote is the mischief at which equal
protection is aimed, there is considerable force in an argument
that the vote should not be diluted or weighted in either branch
of a legislature. And so the question becomes one of determining
whether legislative apportionment is comparable to racial segregation, in which the command of the equal protection clause is absolute in forbidding classification altogether. The initial, but
overwhelming, answer of the state and lower federal courts rejects
the notion that classification is altogether forbidden. 210 Moreover,
it should be remembered that, no matter how attractive in the
abstract may be the notion of absolute population equality in both
houses of a state legislature, there is little, if any, indication that
the Supreme Court will accept that absolutist standard.211 However, alternative solutions, attempting to reconcile a requirement
of strict application of the equal-population principle in one house
with a more permissive application of population standards in the
second house, have for the most part been mere statements of result, devoid of articulated reasons. It is important, therefore, to
determine whether reasons exist to support results that are in
fact being reached.
One proposition at least seems logically supportable. Even
when the equal-population principle is satisfied in one house,
population cannot be altogether disregarded in the other house.
To permit a state to choose an apportionment formula in the
second house entirely without regard to population would allow
frustration of the equal-population principle in the other house.
The state could, for example, so redispose the meaningful aspects
of legislative power that the population-based house would be
stripped of any significant share in the decisional process while
the non-population-based house would be left in effective control.
Surely equal protection is not thus to be ousted of meaning. That
being the case, it appears to follow that population must to some
extent be a factor in both houses. Solicitor General Archibald Cox
emphasized this point when he predicted in the summer of 1962:
"[I]t would not surprise me greatly if the Supreme Court
were ultimately to hold that if seats in one branch of the
legislature are apportioned in direct ratio to population, the
210

211

See text at notes 171-94 supra.
See text at notes 166-70 supra.
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allocation of seats in the upper branch may recognize historical, political and geographical subdivisions provided that
the departure from equal representation in proportion to
the population is not too extreme."212
Like the courts and other commentators, the Solicitor General
provided no answer to the critical questions: Why must population
be taken into account at all in the second house if it has already
been employed as the sole factor in the other house and, conversely,
what is the justification under the equal protection clause for
allowing any significant departure from the equal-population principle? Then, too, what sense can be made of permitti~g departure
from equal representation in proportion to population if "not
too extreme"?
A reason has already been suggested for requiring that population be significantly employed in fixing representation in both
houses, so that the equal-population principle in one house not be
frustrated by manipulation designed to deprive that house of any
real role in the legislative process. Conceding, then, the relevance
of population in both houses, the question remains as to why population should be less than the sole factor in both and how much
deviation from the population norm should be tolerated as "not
too extreme." It is suggested here that the latter half of the question, the defining of "not too extreme," can await the event of
experience in decided cases once the principle is accepted that
under the equal protection clause some departure from the equalpopulation principle is in fact justifiable.
Answer to the basic question demands inquiry into the nature
of the equal protection command. If, as already suggested,213 the
clause should be read as a vindicator of political democracy in a
representative government, then the essential end to be served is
an assurance that each person will have, as nearly as may be,
an equal opportunity to share in the political process through
which the persons charged with the legislative function are chosen.
If equal protection requires that persons similarly situated be
similarly treated, does it follow that all qualified voters within a
state are similarly situated and must therefore be treated exactly
alike? 214 An affirmative answer, requiring full application of the
Cox, Current Constitutional Issues, 48 A.B.A.J. 711, 712 (1962).
See text at notes 205-09 supra.
The term "qualified voter" itself suggests a classificatory scheme by which determination is made of eligibility to vote. There is no intention here to cast doubt on the
212
213
214
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equal-population principle in every legislative body, readily suggests itself; but on reflection that answer appears almost too facile.
That which deserves protection is the right of every citizen to
exert his full measure of influence in state elections. The question
cannot be avoided as to whether that full measure of representation
is still possible even if the equal-population principle is departed
from in one house to a limited extent.
The answer is here suggested that some kinds of limited deviations should not be forbidden by the equal protection clause so
long as it can be shown that they do not interfere with full and
equal participation in the democratic electoral process. It becomes
necessary then to determine what factors, if any, satisfy such a test.
E. Factors Justifying Some Deviation From the Equal-

Population Principle
The factors which have been advanced as a basis for disregarding, in whole or in part, the command of representation in accordance with population, include the following: geography, history,
political unit lines, and even the amount of direct taxes paid.
First, it should be observed, as by now must be evident, that none
of these, alone or in combination, should be deemed acceptable as
an alternative to representation in accordance with population.
Thus, the only question is which of these, if any, might be employed in one house only to supplement a formula calling for
primary reliance on the equal-population principle. Even so
viewed, however, most of the commonly accepted standards appear
defective when measured against the suggested constitutional test.
1. Geography as a factor has been favorably considered in the
New York case, W. M. C. A., Inc. v. Simon, 215 where the court suggested that it was not irrational for a state to deny representation in
strict accordance with population to districts including more than
half the population, but comprising only three percent of the land
area of the state. On that basis the court justified substantial departures from population of nearly two to one in the New York
senate and in excess of six to one in the assembly. 216 The dissenters
power of the state to impose reasonable restrictions on the right of franchise based on
age, residence, ability to read and write the English language, or even the payment of a
poll tax. See, e.g., Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277 (1937), upholding the exaction of a
poll tax, and exemptions of women, the aged, and minors. See also Williams v. Mississippi,
170 U.S. 213 (1898). The proposed twenty-fourth amendment, if ratified by three-fourths
of the states, would outlaw the poll tax.
208 F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962).
Appellants' Jurisdictional Statement, p. 7, W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 31 U.S.L. WEEK
3132 (U.S. Sept 26, 1962) (No. 460). Over the nation as a whole it is estimated that 70%
215
210
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in Scholle v. Hare 211 made a similar point in denying that voters
from Detroit should be entitled to the same representation on a
population basis as that accorded to voters from rural areas. Even
conceding that it may be rational-in the sense of understandable
-for a state legislature to weight representation on the basis of
area considerations, it seems much more doubtful that this could
satisfy the demands of equal protection. If the right protected by
the clause is the right of individuals, as is assuredly the case, it
seems not permissible to measure-and restrict-the right of franchise in terms of factors not related to the individual. The happenstance of residence on a farm, in a small community, or a large
city should be irrelevant in determining the value of the franchise.
Neither acres, nor trees, nor cows are entitled to vote, and their
owners should not be favored in the legislative councils because of
the fact of ownership. Geography as such does not merit protection
from outlawry by the equal protection clause.
2. The amount of direct taxes paid is a factor only in the New
Hampshire senate, but one which the New Hampshire Supreme
Court has upheld as not irrational and not forbidden by the equal
protection clause.218 Apparently, justification is found in the conclusion that in one house of the legislature the landed interests
should be permitted weighted representation, presumably in order
to fend off any ill-considered legislation that might otherwise be
adopted by landless voters. The fact that in the particular case no
serious imbalance in urban-rural representation has resulted is not
the point. This is of course not the way of democracy. Here,
perhaps even more clearly than in the case of utilizing geography as
a factor, the amount of direct taxes paid should not be permitted
as a partial, let alone an exclusive, determinant of the proportion
of representation to which a district might be entitled.
3. For similar reasons there does not appear to be justification
for special recognition in weighted votes to economic or ethnic
interests. Neither labor nor management, neither dairy farming
of the people now live on about 1% of the land. Schattschneider, Urbanization and Reapportionment, 72 YALE L.J. 7 (1962).
217 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350, 357, 358 (1962). It is interesting to note that the
apportionment formula suggested by the Michigan Constitutionai Convention in the
proposed new state constitution would, in the senate, accord population a factor of four
and area a factor of one (art. IV, § 2). Under this formula, Keweenaw County, with
2,417 people and 27,500 acres of inland water and 348,200 acres of land, would have
a representation equivalent to 22,141 people. Tyler, What Is Representative Government?,
The New Republic, July 16, 1962, pp. 15, 16.
218 Levitt v. Maynard, 182 A.2d 897 (N.H. 1962). Interestingly enough, the three
largest cities are slightly over-represented. Id. at 898.
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nor shipping, neither racial nor religious minorities should be
entitled as such to a weighted voice in the legislative forum. To do
so is to tilt the democratic process dangerously and impermissibly.
"If the State has the power arbitrarily to enhance the voting power
of one group, it has equal power to repress the same group or any
other." 219
4. History without more scarcely seems deserving of recognition
as a factor permitting distortion of voter representation away from
the norm of equality. The equal protection clause should be read
in the present tense, as the Court observed in Brown v. Board of
Education when it refused to "turn the clock back ...." 220 The
fact that a legislature has historically disregarded or minimized
the element of population in fixing its legislative apportionment
can scarcely mean that when inequities are revealed, they should
be allowed to persist without change. The only way in which
history might be thought to play a more acceptable part would be
to say tl1at what is meant by an appeal to history is a plea for
recognition of some special significance in long-established and
traditional local governmental divisions such as the counties and
towns. History in the sense of established governmental patterns
speaks with a different and more rational voice, as will be noted
later.
5. Political subdivisions, counties or towns in most instances,
are a part of the history and of the modern political apparatus of
every state. In nearly all states representation in one or both houses
of the state legislature is affected to some extent by the existence
of these local units of government. Modern malapportionment is
often attributable to the fact of continuing adherence to these
units as a basis for representation, without adjustment for intervening population changes that make original units anachronistic
in the modern political world. In Connecticut, for example, when
towns were originally selected as the basis for representation, with
some adjustments among them to reflect population differentials,
no one predicted the ultimate differences in rate of growth that
would give Union with 383 inhabitants the same number of
representatives as Hartford with its 162,178 inhabitants.221 Such
examples of changing population leading to ever-worsening malapportionment are of course repeated in nearly all states. Striking
210 Brief for United States as Amicus Curiae, pp. 18-19, Gray v. Sanders, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 3012 (U.S. May 11, 1962) (No. 112).
2'.:W 347 U.S. at 492.
221 BoYD, op. cit. supra note 201, at IO.
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examples from various regions of the country would include California, where a vote in the smallest senate district is worth 422
times a vote in Los Angeles County; 222 Georgia, where the countyunit system gave six state electoral votes to Fulton County with
more than half a million population and two electoral votes to
Echols County with a population of less than two thousand; 223
and Rhode Island, which permits horizontal and vertical inequities
by giving each city or town one representative plus one additional
member for every 25,000 population, resulting in differentials of
more than four to one.224
It is easy to multiply examples of severe malapportionment
attributable to state legislative districting done in accordance with
county and township lines. The problem is to determine whether
some or all of the apportionments based on political unit lines
should be deemed vulnerable to challenge on equal protection
grounds. Supporters of the "one man-one vote" ideal would presumably reject any standard which takes into account factors extraneous to population. That it is not possible to preserve intact
the equal-population principle when consideration is given to
representation by governmental units is readily understandable.
The ways in which political units are fitted into state apportionments are varied, but ordinarily include one or both of the following principles, each of which involves more or less substantial
departures from representation in accordance with population.
(a) Each county (or town) may be authorized to elect at least
one senator (or representative). In the eight legislative bodies in
which, before Baker, equal representation was granted to each unit
regardless of population,225 the distortion is at its maximum since
population counts for nothing. The views here suggested would
require invalidation of such formulas. Much more common, however, is a requirement that each county or town be entitled to
one representative and that additional representatives be allotted
on the basis of population up to the full number of seats in the
legislature. While such a formula can never satisfy fully the equalpopulation principle, it can provide at least rough approximations
if two conditions are met: (1) If the number of seats in the legislative branch is several times larger than the number of political
Id. at 15.
Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158, 160 (N.D. Ga. 1962) [for later history, see note
158 supra].
224 Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296, 301 (R.I. 1962).
225 BoYD, op. cit. supra note 201, at 3.
222
223
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units entitled to one representative each, the chance for population to play a dominant role is good. But if the number of counties
to be represented approaches the number of legislators to be
elected, the population principle is necessarily submerged.226
(2) If the population spread from the least populous to the most
populous county is not large, the opportunity for adjustment to
approximate population standards is increased. But where the
population spread is great, as is the case in states with one or more
large population centers (which means nearly all states), population cannot be adequately represented short of a legislative body
of many hundreds of members. The inescapable conclusion is that
continued provision for at least one representative from each local
political unit is nearly always inconsistent with the equal-population principle. Other formulas should be preferred.
(b) States often provide that no county (or town) can be divided
in fixing election districts except where such a unit is entitled to
more than one representative. In recognition of the practical
difficulties and inequities of assuring individual representation to
every county, provision is thus allowed for the joining of two or
more thinly populated counties to make a single election district.
This permits considerable progress toward equalization among the
various election districts. But the provision against division of
counties makes complete equality unlikely; and the practicalities
make its realization impossible. After all, counties scattered about
a state cannot be joined into a single election district to effect
equality with mathematical nicety. Even in the absence of a provision for compact election districts, common sense would dictate
that they must at least be contiguous.
Despite the difficulties suggested above, this proposition should
not necessarily be thought to violate equal protection. The Michigan Supreme Court, for example, might well approve such a plan
in Michigan if none of the resulting representation ratios exceeded
two to one.227 There is, moreover, considerable affirmative justification for allowing this much latitude to accommodate permitted
differences in state political structures. In varying degrees the states
220 See, e.g., the Florida house of representatives, composed of 135 members to be
elected from sixty-seven counties ranging in population from 2,868 (Gilchrist) to 935,047
(Dade). Through 1962, Dade County was allotted three representatives and Gilchrist
County one representative. For discussion of this and of amendments proposed in 1962
(later defeated), see Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316 (S.D. Fla. 1962). The 125 Kansas
representatives are elected from 105 counties. NATIONAL MUNICIPAL LEAGUE, COMPENDIUM
ON U:GISLATIVE APPORTIONME..'<T (Kansas) (1962).
227 See text at notes 171-79 supra.

700

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61

have committed to their counties and towns some or many of the
elements of governmental power. As a consequence many of the
general and special acts of state legislatures directly affect the local
governmental units, the counties, cities, towns, and villages.228
The provision against division of counties in the creation of election districts is one way of recognizing the need for such units to
have at least a voice in the legislature. That it need not preponderate unduly can be assured by provision for adding counties
together for the choice of a single legislator (and by the equal
protection clause). Whether the system of state and local governments reflected in these provisions is wise or unwise, efficient or
inefficient, is not the issue. Unless the states are to be denied the
right to choose forms of local government believed suitable to
their separate exigencies, these governmental units should not be
rendered totally impotent in the only forums in which they can be
effectively heard-the state legislatures. Equal protection of persons seems not unduly muted if modest accommodation is permitted in one house of a state legislature for representation of these
local government interests, always of course assuming that population remains the strongly dominant factor.
V.

THE AVAILABLE REMEDIES

Baker v. Carr has been widely thought to contain two mysteries, one the question of judicially manageable standards, and
the other the question of remedies traditionally available to the
judiciary. If, as suggested earlier, the standards under the equal
protection clause are not so elusive as some have feared, the question of remedies at once becomes more ponderable. Upon removal
of the fear and uncertainty of unknown standards for decision,
solution of the more limited problem of implementation becomes
less difficult. Moreover, as already observed in another context,
the most striking fact about the Baker decision is the enthusiastic
reception it received and the rush to implement it. Mr. Justice
Brennan, speaking for the Court in words that must have been
carefully weighed, offered calm assurance that the problem of
remedies will not prove insurmountable. He said:
"Beyond noting that we have no cause at this stage to doubt
the District Court will be able to fashion relief if violations
of constitutional right are found, it is improper now to con22s See the discussion of this point in Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp. 316, 321-22 (S.D.
Fla. 1962).
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sider what remedy would be most appropriate if appellants
prevail at the trial." 229
In making this confident prediction Mr. Justice Brennan may
well have had in mind the very substantial number of cases before
Baker in which both state and federal courts had taken jurisdiction of various apportionment disputes and, through one device
or another, had effected workable solutions.230 Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has not hesitated, once jurisdiction was agreed
upon and the existing apportionment was found defective, to
suggest the election at large of congressional representatives.
Smiley v. H olm,231 decided by a unanimous Court in 1932, was
just such a case. Minnesota's governor had vetoed a bill creating
new congressional districts after the state delegation had been
reduced pursuant to the 1930 census. The legislature, denying the
governor's right of participation, declared the new districts effective despite the veto. When the Minnesota courts denied relief
at the suit of a qualified voter and taxpayer against the secretary
of state, the United States Supreme Court reversed; the injunction was issued; and the election was held at large.232
Concern about the adequacy of judicial remedies to correct
state malapportionment appears to consist in part of fears lest
the judiciary overreach its proper function either in dealing with
its co-equal branches of government or in dealing with other
sovereign components of a federal structure. In part the concern
seems also to issue from awareness of the powerless position of
the judiciary and consequent worry that potential disregard of
the judicial command would damage irreparably public confidence in the judicial institution as a voice of ultimate authority.
Answer to both aspects of this concern about the potential futility
of judicial intervention is found in the wealth of cases decided
before Baker in which that danger did not materialize, and in the
emerging pattern of cases decided since Baker which suggest a
similarly happy augury for the future.
369 U.S. at 198.
For an instructive review, see Lewis, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal
Courts, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1057, 1066-70, 1087-90 (1958). For a post-Baker review of similar
materials, see Friedelbaum, Baker v. Carr: The New Doctrine of Judicial Intervention and
Its Implications for American Federalism, 29 U. CHI. L. REv. 673, 699-702 (1962).
231 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
232 77 CONG. REC. 71 (1933). In two cases decided the same day, the Court reached
the same result, with the effect of requiring election at large of Missouri's thirteen
representatives [Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932)], and of two New York representatives [Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932)].
220
230
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Legislative reaction to judicial condemnations of state and
congressional apportionments should be vastly encouraging to
those who fear for the respect in which American courts, state
and federal, are held. Despite judicial lack of power over "purse
and sword," no instance of legislative defiance of judicial pronouncement has been discovered in the area of apportionment.
Courts have of course proceeded cautiously and no more rapidly
or drastically than seemed inescapably necessary. But it is remarkable in how many instances, even before Baker, legislatures responded to judicial determination of the invalidity of an apportionment scheme, even without remedial implementation.233 The
same technique has been employed with similar success in the
state and lower federal courts since Baker.234 Certainly, there is
nothing novel in a federal court's refusal to approve matters committed to its review without specifying what action must be taken
to satisfy constitutional or legislative command. Sufficient example
is found in the review of federal administrative action by which
the Court simply explains the legal error and remands to the
agency for further action.235 If any complaint is to be made of the
usefulness of the in-effect reference back to the state legislature
for appropriate action, it can only be that the lower courts and
legislatures alike have so far been handicapped by their inability
to know for certain what would be the ultimate standard adopted
in definition of equal protection. As this matter is resolved, the
reference-back technique should prove fully sufficient in nearly
all cases.
Encouraging though it is to be able to predict that nearly all
233 See Magraw v. Donovan, 159 F. Supp. 901 (D. Minn. 1958); Dyer v. Kazuhisa Abe,
138 F. Supp. 220 (D. Hawaii 1956); Shaw v. Adkins, 202 Ark. 856, 153 S.W.2d 415 (1941);
Armstrong v. Mitten, 95 Colo. 425, 37 P.2d 757 (1934); Moran v. Bowley, 347 Ill. 148, 179
N.E. 526 (1932); Brooks v. State, 162 Ind. 568, 70 N.E. 980 (1904); Denney v. State, 144
Ind. 503, 42 N.E. 929 (1896); Parker v. State, 133 Ind. 178, 32 N.E. 836, rehearing denied,
133 Ind. 212, 33 N.E. 119 (1892); Stiglitz v. Schardien, 239 Ky. 799, 40 S.W.2d 315 (1931);
Ragland v. Anderson, 125 Ky. 141, 100 S.W. 865 (1907); Merrill v. Mitchell, 257 Mass.
184, 153 N.E. 562 (1926); Donovan v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 225 Mass.
55, 113 N.E. 740 (1916); Attorney General v. Suffolk County Apportionment Comm'rs, 224
Mass. 598, 113 N.E. 581 (1916); Williams v. Secretary of State, 145 Mich. 447, 108 N.W.
749 (1906); Board of Supervisors v. Blacker, 92 Mich. 638, 52 N.W. 951 (1892); Giddings
v. Blacker, 93 Mich. 1, 52 N.W. 944 (1892); State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 241 Mo.
433, 146 S.W. 40 (1912); Rogers v. Morgan, 127 Neb. 456, 256 N.W. I (1934): Asbury
Park Press, Inc. v. Woolley, 33 N.J. 1, 161 A.2d 705 (1960); In re Sherill, 188 N.Y. 185,
81 N.E. 124 (1907); People ex rel. Baird v. Board of Supervisors, 138 N.Y. 95, 33 N.E.
827 (1893); Jones v. Freeman, 193 Okla. 554, 146 P.2d 564 (1943); State ex rel. Lamb v.
Cunningham, 83 Wis. 90, 53 N.W. 35 (1892); State v. Cunningham, 81 Wis. 440, 51 N.W.
724 (1892). See also Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932); Annot., 2 A.L.R.
1337 (1919).
234 See notes 194, 202 supra.
235 See also Lewis, supra note 230, at 1087.
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apportionment cases can thus be handled smoothly without raising
the troublesome questions of potential court-legislature conflict,
still the problems of those harder cases, however few, must be
faced up to. Indeed, one of the principal reasons for which the
reference-back technique has ordinarily proved successful is that
courts have customarily stated their willingness to act if legislatures do not; and, significantly, courts have retained jurisdiction
pending such action. It has also been common practice to fix a
period of time within which the legislature must act on pain of
having the matter reopened before the courts.

A. Redistricting by the Court
The spectre most commonly raised by those who fear judicial
impotence to devise and enforce remedies is that of a court actually redrawing the election district lines itself. But that is
exactly what Mr. Justice Clark favored as at least a temporary expedient in Baker,236 a suggestion similar to one which had been
advanced to the Court in the amicus brief for the United States
in that case. 237 Although the majority of the Court did not act on
the suggestion, and the three-judge court on remand also found
it unnecessary because of concession of the invalidity of the Tennessee apportionment,238 the possibility remains.
One court, confronted with new legislation that failed to
eliminate the complained-of malapportionment, put together a
new plan and ordered it into effect for the general election in
November 1962. And the sky did not fall. This occurred in the
Alabama case, Sims v. Frink, 239 in which the three-judge district
court studied portions of various legislative proposals, accepting
the best and rejecting the worst features, and thus arrived at a
concededly temporary and imperfect plan. The court stated: "The
duty to reapportion rests on the Legislature. This Court acts in the
matter reluctantly because of the long-continued default and total
inability of the Legislature to reapportion itself."240
B. Injunctions
A recurring pattern in cases following Baker has been to seek
injunctive relief against various state officials connected with the
electoral process to restrain them from conducting a forthcoming
369 U.S. at 253-64.
Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae on Rcargumcnt, pp. 74-78.
206 F. Supp. 341, 345 (\V.D. Tenn. 1962).
208 F. Supp. 431 (M:.D. Ala. 1962).
Id. at 441. Sec also Fortner v. Barnett, No. 59965, Ch. Ct. of First Judicial Dist.
of Hinds County, Miss., reported in Appendix infra.
236
237
238
230
!!40
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primary or general election absent correction of alleged unconstitutionally ordained election districts. Ordinarily the courts have
avoided an injunction, usually by the device of according to the
legislature an opportunity for corrective action. However, in the
Georgia county unit case, Sanders v. Gray,241 an injunction was
issued to restrain state election officials from using that system
where it fell short of a standard already stated by the court.242

C. Mandamus
Perhaps the most drastic remedy, and the one least likely to
be used with any frequency, is the ·writ of mandamus. There are
special difficulties in the use of mandamus against a legislature
that make it unlikely that it will serve any important function in
apportionment cases; 243 but the possibility of utilizing such a
remedy is not foreclosed.244 Interestingly enough, in the Rhode
Island case, Sweeney v. Notte, 245 the state supreme court doubted
its authority to supervise reapportionment in the state legislature
because it "would be in the nature of mandamus by duress." 246
But it offered the opinion that if the legislature failed to act within
a reasonable time, a federal court, presumably not restricted as
would be a state court by the respect between two co-equal
241 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962) [for later history, see note 158 supra]. In Mann
v. Davis, Civil No. 2604, E.D. Va., Nov. 28, 1962, the court issued an injunction against
conducting elections on the basis of the existing apportionment, but stayed its effective
date until January 31, 1963, to permit legislative consideration. This in tum was stayed
by Mr. Chief Justice Warren on December 15, 1962. See note 184 supra. See also Scholle
v. Hare, 367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), in which on July 17, 1962, Mr. Justice
Stewart stayed the mandatory injunction issued in that case.
242 "[A] unit system for use in a party primary is invidiously discriminatory if any
unit has less than its share to the nearest whole number proportionate to population,
or to the whole of the vote in a recent party gubernatorial primary, or to the whole vote
for electors of the party in a recent presidential election; provided no discrimination is
deemed to be invidious under the system if the disparity against any county is not in
excess of the disparity that exists against any state in the most recent electoral college
allocation, or under the equal proportions formula for representation of the several
states in the Congress, and provided it is adjusted to accord with changes in the basis
at least once each ten years. This is a 'judicially manageable standard' contemplated
in Baker v. Carr." 203 F. Supp. at 170.
The suggested standard has been criticized for being rigidly mathematical and for its
unfortunate link with the hard-to-predict vagaries of the electoral college. Dixon, Legislative Apportionment and the Federal Constitution, 27 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 329, 373.75
(1962); Neal, Baker v. Carr: Politics in Search of Law, 1962 SUPREME COURT REv. 252,
318-19. Appropriately, the Supreme Court rejected this standard as too narrowly restrictive, instead emphasizing in this context (statewide primary elections) that the principle
of "one person, one vote" should control. Gray v. Sanders, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 4285, 4288
(U.S. March 18, 1963).
243 See Friedelbaum, supra note 230, at 699.
244 Virginia v. West Virginia, 246 U.S-. 565 (1918).
246 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962).
246 Id. at 303.
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branches of government, would probably reapportion or order
the legislature to do so.

D. Ordering Election at Large
Few if any legislators relish the physical and financial hardships, as well as the increased uncertainties, involved in a statewide election at large. Accordingly, the fear of a judicial order
for an at-large election has in the past proved an effective prod
to induce an otherwise reluctant legislature to make essential apportionment changes.247 Judicial intimation of such an order is
particularly likely to be effective in inducing legislative action, in
view of the fact that elections at large of members of congressional
delegations have in fact resulted from Supreme Court decisions,248
lower federal court decisions,249 and from state court decisions. 250
The fact that this fairly drastic remedy was not immediately
utilized by any court following Baker does not necessarily mean
that it cannot be applied in the state reapportionment cases. But
it is true that there are potentially significant differences between
congressional and state districting in this respect. Whether a federal court could successfully impose an at-large election upon a
state whose election laws do not contemplate such may raise difficulties which the federal courts will prefer to avoid; 251 and there
may be hazards surrounding the always doubtful area of de jure
and de facto legislative authority. 252 But perhaps these problems
are too special and certainly do not apply everywhere. Serious
consideration should be given to the further use of the at-large
election device.
CONCLUSION

Baker v. Carr marks the full maturation of the libertarian
aspects of the equal protection clause and provides the courts,
federal and state alike, with an opportunity to vindicate as a constitutionally protected right the assurance to all persons of an opportunity to full and equal participation in the principal rite of the
democratic process, the exercise of the franchise. As state legislatures become more fully responsive to the electorate whom they
serve there should be renewed opportunity for the states to
See Lewis, supra note 230, at 1088-89; see also cases cited in note 233 supra.
Carroll v. Becker, 285 U.S. 380 (1932); Koenig v. Flynn, 285 U.S. 375 (1932); Smiley
v. Holm, 285 U.S. 355 (1932).
240 Hume v. Mahan, I F. Supp. 142 (E.D. Ky. 1932).
2r:;o Brown v. Saunders, 159 Va. 28, 166 S.E. 105 (1932).
'!!til See Friedelbaum, supra note 230, at 700.
252 For a thoughtful analysis of state cases predating Baker, see Note, 15 RUTGERS
L. REY. 82, 86-90 (1960). See also Neal, supra note 242, at .!103-04, 306-08.
247
248
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demonstrate the wisdom of reserving to the states those powers not
committed to the national government.253 The plea of states' rights
can become again the dignified and meaningful claim to separate
sovereign rights and obligations that it should always have been,
rather than the strident and prideful cry it has sometimes seemed.
253 "[T]here is a strong national interest in encouraging vigorous and responsible
State and local government." House Comm. on Gov't Operations, Federal-State-Local
Relations: Federal Grants-In-Aid, H.R. REP. No. 2533, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 47 (1958). See
also THE EDITORS OF FORTUNE, THE EXPLODING METROPOLIS 1 (1957); U.S. CoMM'N ON
INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 3, 38, 40 (1955).

APPENDIX

A Summary of Significant Reapportionment Litigation Initiated During 1962
Alabama
Sims v. Frink, 205 F. Supp. 245, temporary injunction continued, 208 F. Supp. 431
(M.D. Ala. 1962), appeal pending sub nom. Reynolds v. Sims, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147
(U.S. Oct. 12, 1962) (No. 508). The court invalidated the apportionment of both houses
which had been adopted by the legislature in July 1962, and drew up its own plan,
adopting portions of various legislative proposals, for use in the 1962 elections, but
cautioned the legislature to take further corrective action in 1963 or face additional court
action.
Alsup v. Mayhall, 208 F. Supp. 713 (S.D. Ala. !962). In a suit to restrain enforcement
of a law providing for election of eight congressional candidates from nine former districts (one seat having been lost as a result of apportionment after 1960 census), the
court recognized the applicability of Baker v. Carr, but dismissed for lack of a showing of
inequality.
California
Silver v. Jordan, Civil No. 62-953-MC, S.D. Cal. 1962. In an action seeking additional
representation for Los Angeles County (but not full equality), the court denied a preliminary injunction in August 1962. In September, a stipulation was entered by the
parties that the action would be dismissed by plaintiff if California Initiative No. 23
(to increase the Senate from forty to fifty, with the largest gain in new seats for Los
Angeles County) should be approved November 6, 1962, while plaintiff could petition for
a hearing on the merits if the initiative proposal should be defeated (which it was).
Yorty v. Anderson, petition for writ of mandate in California Supreme Court filed
December 28, 1962. Petitioners seek reapportionment of the state into forty senatorial
districts "as nearly equal in population as may be," as required by § 6 of article IV of
the constitution of 1879, and invalidation of subsequent amendments providing that no
county shall contain more than one senatorial district.
Colorado
Lisco v. McNichols, 208 F. Supp. 471 (D. Colo. 1962). Although the court concluded
that disparities shown made a prima facie case for correction, the case was held for
hearing until after the November 6, 1962, election, at which a population plan for both
houses was defeated and a so-called "federal" plan was approved.
In the Matter of Legislative Reapportionment, 374 P.2d 66 (Colo. 1962). In an original
proceeding in the Colorado Supreme Court for the issuance of a prerogative writ, the
court retained jurisdiction until after the election described above, and indicated willingness to act if necessary despite the problems contemplated.
Connecticut
Valenti v. Dempsey, Civil No. 9544, D. Conn. 1962. In a suit to attack apportionment
of both houses of the Connecticut General Assembly, the court, on December 20, 1962,
denied an application for a preliminary injunction to restrain state officials from convening the 1963 assembly and to command them to reconvene the 1961 assembly to take
action on the senate alone (allegedly only the 1961 assembly can reapportion on the basis
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of 1960 census figures). The denial was based in part on the fact that plaintiff was from
an over-represented senate district; but jurisdiction was retained over the entire proceeding.

Delaware
Sincock v. Terry, 207 F. Supp. 205 (D. Del. 1962). The court withheld action until
August 7, 1962, pending legislative action. The legislature proposed a constitutional
amendment, which would become effective in 1963, reapportioning the house on population and the senate on geography. The court denied ,motions to dismiss and ordered
trial on the constitutional provisions, including the proposed amendment. Sincock v.
Terry, 210 F. Supp. 395, .396 (D. Del. 1962).
Florida
Sobel v. Adams, 208 F. Supp• .316 (S.D. Fla. 1962). The court held existing reapportionment laws invidiously discriminatory, as well as the first 1962 legislative attempt
at correction. At a special session in August 1962, the legislature withdrew the earlierproposed amendment and offered another which the court indicated would be acceptable
if approved by the voters on November 6, 1962. Jurisdiction was retained; the amendment was defeated; and a further session of the legislature adjourned without agreeing
on another proposal.
Lund v. Mathas, 145 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1962). This was a suit filed in Circuit Court for
Volusia County, Florida, challenging the congressional districting within the state. On
October 24, 1962, the Supreme Court of Florida rejected the claim, holding Colegrove v.
Green still controlling as to congressional districting.
Georgia
Sanders v. Gray, 203 F. Supp. 158 (N.D. Ga. 1962), vacated and remanded, .31 U.S.L.
WEEK 4285 (U.S. March 18, 1963). The lower court enjoined the use in primary elections
of the so-called "county unit" plan (even as amended one day before judgment) in voting
for statewide offices, and the Supreme Court remanded to the district court for a decree
consistent with the principle of "one person, one vote." The Court avoided, however,
any expression of opinion as to permissible deviations, if any, in legislative districting
cases.
Toombs v. Fortson, 205 F. Supp. 248 (N.D. Ga. 1962). Although refusing an injunction
until the legislature could act, the court held the existing state legislative apportionment invidious and ai:bitrary, and stated that at least one house of the General Assembly
must reflect population. Thereafter the state senate was redistricted on a population basis.
Wesberry v. Vandiver, 260 F. Supp. 276 (N.D. Ga. 1962). Although the court cited
Baker v. Carr in holding that it had jurisdiction over a suit challenging congressional
districting, it also cited Colegrove v. Green in dismissing for want of equity and other
reasons, including delicacy of the question and possibility of state or congressional legislative remedy. Chief Judge Elbert Tuttle dissented, favoring retention of jurisdiction
pending opportunity for legislative correction.
Idaho
Caesar v. Williams, .371 P.2d 241 (Idaho 1962). The Idaho Supreme Court, over two
dissents, dismissed an action challenging state apportionment providing for one senator
from each county and at least one representative from each county.
Hearne v. Smylie, D. Idaho, filed Oct. .31, 1962. The action requests convening of a
three-judge court to retain supervisory jurisdiction until the 1963 legislature has an
opportunity to correct the alleged state legislative malapportionment.
Indiana
Stout v. Hendricks, Civil No. IP 61-C-2.36, S.D. Ind. 1962. Plaintiffs suggest various
alternative forms of relief from alleged state legislative malapportionment, including
injunctive relief to restrain operation of apportionment statutes, an election at large,
or an election based on districts fixed by the court until the legislature acts to establish
new districts.
Grills v• .Anderson, Cause No. S 59-600, Super. Ct. of Marion County, Ind., 1962. The
court denied a motion for summary injunction to restrain election of November 6, 1962,
for members of the General Assembly.
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Iowa
Davis v. Synhorst, Civil No. 5-1289, S.D. Iowa 1962. In a suit challenging both the
present state apportionment and that of a proposed constitutional amendment, the court,
on October 20, 1962, denied defendants' motion to dismiss.
Kansas
Harris v. Shanahan, No. 90476, Dist Ct. of Shawnee County, Kan., 1962. Decision of
the trial court that state legislative apportionment is repugnant to the due process clause
was in effect stayed pending appeal to tlie Kansas Supreme Court.
Kentucky
Schmied v. Combs, Civil No. 4380, W.D. Ky. 1962. The suit challenges state legislative
apportionment and seeks to compel the governor to call a special legislative session.
Combs v. Matthews, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2395 (Ky. Ct. App. Jan. 31, 1963), holding that
redistricting of the lower house to include more than two counties in a single district
is not barred by the state constitution.
Maryland
Maryland Comm. for Fair Representation v. Tawes, 228 Md. 412, 180 A.2d 656 (per
curiam), explanation of per curiam order, 184 A.2d 715 (1962), appeal pending, 31 U.S.L.
WEEK 3173 (U.S. Oct. 24, 1962) (No. 554). Pursuant to court of appeals directions in April
1962, a trial court found invidious discrimination in the composition of the House of Delegates. Thereafter, at a special legislative session, nineteen delegates were added as a "stopgap" measure, and a proposed constitutional amendment was defeated. In a four-three
decision, the court of appeals in September 1962 upheld the county-based apportionment
formula in the senate.
Michigan
Scholle v. Hare, 360 Mich. 1, 104 N.W.2d 63 (1960), remanded, 369 U.S. 429, on remand,
367 Mich. 176, 116 N.W.2d 350 (1962), petition for certiorari filed sub nom. Beadle v.
Scholle, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3147 (U.S. Oct. 15, 1962) (No. 517). The Michigan Supreme Court,
on reconsideration in light of Baker v. Carr, as ordered by the United States Supreme
Court, held, four to three, that both houses must be apportioned in relation to population and that the senate apportionment was on that basis invalid, requiring legislative
reapportionment within thirty days or election of senate candidates at large on November 6, 1962. On July 17, 1962, Mr. Justice Stewart granted a stay of that order.
Minnesota
Minnesota ex rel. LaRose v. Tahash, 115 N.W .2d 687 (Minn. 1962). The Minnesota
Supreme Court upheld validity of a statute prohibiting operation of motor vehicles
without the owner's permission, even though the statute had been enacted after changes
in population resulting in claimed inequality of representation following the last re•
apportionment.
Hedlund v. Hansen, Civil No. 4-62, No. 122, D. Minn. 1962. The action challenges
apportionment as to the Board of County Commissioners of Hennepin County, Minnesota.
Mississippi
Fortner v. Barnett, No. 59965, Ch. Ct. of First Judicial Dist. of Hinds County, Miss.,
1962. The state trial court held the existing apportionment law invalid and prescribed the
districts it would order into effect if the legislature did not act. The legislature thereafter reapportioned itself, but its proposal was defeated at the election of November 6,
1962.
Missouri
Preisler v. Hearnes, No. 49370, decided by Missouri Supreme Court en bane on
Dec. 11, 1962. The Court accepted Baker v. Carr as analogous, but rejected a challenge
to congressional districting where the variation from smallest to largest districts was from
378,486 to 506,854. 31 U.S.L. WEEK 2304 (1962).
Nebraska
League of Municipalities v. Marsh, 209 F. Supp. 189 (D. Neb. 1962). The court found
substantial disparities among election districts, but refused to enjoin voting on a proposed
constitutional amendment which would give areas some weight in apportionment, and
denied other relief until after the 1963 legislative session.
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Nevada
Paley v. Sawyer, Civil No. 1593, D. Nev. 1962. The case attacks present state legislative apportionment.
New Hampshire
Levitt v. Maynard, 104 N.H. 243, 182 A.2d 897 (N.H. 1962); Levitt v. Attorney General,
Io-! N.H. 100, 179 A.2d 286 (N.H. 1962). The New Hampshire Supreme Court upheld as
rational the method of fixing state senatorial districts based on equalized valuation of
direct taxes paid.
New Jersey
Jackman v. Bodine, Docket No. C-2293-61, Super. Ct. of N.J. (Cb.), Hudson County,
1962. The suit challenges the existing apportionment in both houses of the New Jersey
legislature and, in the absence of legislative remedy, requests an order limiting the value
of the vote of senators and assemblymen on a weighted-ratio basis and for the holding
of elections at large.
New Mexico
Cargo v. Mechem, filed in Dist. Ct., County of Santa Fe, N.M., 1962. The suit,
challenging apportionment in the New Mexico house of representatives, asks that the
governor be ordered to convene a special session of the legislature and that the conduct
of the next general election in 1964 be enjoined unless correction is made.
New York
W.M.C.A., Inc. v. Simon, 202 F. Supp. 741, remanded, 370 U.S. 190, on remand, 208
F. Supp. 368 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), appeal pending, 31 U.S.L. WEEK 3132 (U.S. Sept. 26, 1962)
(No. 460). The district court, on remand for reconsideration in light of Baker v. Carr,
rejected the challenge made to both houses of New York legislature, finding the existing
apportionment rational.
Honeywood v. Rockefeller, Civil No. 62-0423, E.D.N.Y., affd per curiam, 371 U.S. 1
(1962). The district court denied the grant of a preliminary injunction before trial on
a claim that state election officials had discriminatorily excluded Negroes from a newly
proposed congressional district.
Wright v. Rockefeller, Civil No. 62-2601, S.D.N.Y. 1962. On November 26, 1962, the
court rejected a challenge to congressional districting in New York City, which had
alleged that lines had been drawn to exclude non-white citizens and citizens of Puerto
Rican origin from one district and to include them in three others.
North Dakota
Lein v. Sathre, 201 F. Supp. 535, later decision subsequent to state court action, 205
F. Supp. 536 (D.N.D. 1962). The district court first deferred decision for the North
Dakota Supreme Court to pass on the question. That court did so [113 N.W.2d 679
(N.D. 1962)], holding the existing state apportionment invalid, but denied injunctive relief
against the holding of 1962 general election without reapportionment. Thereafter, the
federal district court, considering itself bound by the state court's further determination
that the authority of the apportioning group within the house of representatives had
expired, and having no reason to believe that the legislature would not act in 1963,
declined relief, but retained jurisdiction until thirty days after the conclusion of the
1963 legislative session.
Ohio
Nolan v. DiSalle, Civil No. 6082, S.D. Ohio 1962. The suit challenges the existing
apportionment in the Ohio house of representatives.
Sive v. Ellis, Civil No. 6491, S.D. Ohio 1962. Same as Nolan v. DiSalle, supra.
Ohio ex rel. Scott v. Masterson, 173 Ohio St. 402, 183 N.E.2d 376 (1962). In an original
mandamus proceeding the Ohio Supreme Court ordered the Cleveland City Council to
comply with mandatory provisions of the city charter for periodic reapportionment of
voting districts in the city.
Oklahoma
Moss v. Burkhart, 207 F. Supp. 885 (W.D. Okla. 1962). The court held the existing
apportionment in both houses invalid, retaining jurisdiction until the 1963 legislature
should have a chance to act, in accordance with a standard of "substantial numerical
equality" in both houses. Meanwhile, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had refused to set
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aside a 1961 apportionment because, although invalid under the state constitution, it
was superior to the earlier act. Jones v. Winters, 369 P.2d 135 (Okla. 1961). On November 6, 1962, the voters approved a proposal for a three-man reapportionment commission.

Pennsylvania
Butcher v. Trimarchi, No. 2531, Equity Docket and No. 151, Commonwealth Docket;
Seidman v. Trimarchi, No. 2532, Equity Docket and No. 153, Commonwealth Docket;
Driscoll v. Trimarchi, No. 2533, Equity Docket and No. 154, Commonwealth Docket,
C.P. Ct. of Dauphin County, Pa., 1962. The court, although accepting the relevance of
Baker v. Carr for state court proceedings, refused to upset the election machinery for
November 6, 1962, and therefore declined judgment on the pleadings, pending legislative
action in the next session of the General Assembly.
Rhode Island
Sweeney v. Notte, 183 A.2d 296 (R.I. 1962). The Rhode Island Supreme Court concluded that the existing state legislative apportionment was invalid, but declined to
intervene because of the mandatory obligation of the General Assembly to act. The court
predicted that if that body should fail to act within a reasonable time, a federal court,
not bound by the state court's deference to a co-equal partner, would probably act.
Tennessee
Baker v. Carr, 179 F. Supp. 824 (M.D. Tenn. 1959), remanded, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), on
remand, 206 F. Supp. 341 (M.D. Tenn. 1962). On remand from the United States Supreme
Court the invalidity of the original apportionment was conceded, and the district court
held invalid further legislative acts of 1962. Jurisdiction was retained until June 1963
.to give the Tennessee legislature further opportunity to correct apportionment inequities.
Vermont
Mikell v. Rousseau, 183 A.2d 817 (Vt. 1962). The Vermont Supreme Court cautioned
the legislature to act promptly to correct malapportionment. The legislature responded
by enacting a one-year reapportionment plan for the state senate, providing in the
meanwhile for a study of apportionment in both houses.
Virginia
Mann v. Davis, Civil No. 2604, E.D. Va., Nov. 28, 1962, appeal pending, 31 U.S.L
WEEK 3284 (U.S. Feb. 2, 1963) (No. 797). The court held invalid existing apportionment
in both houses of the Virginia General Assembly. The resulting injunction to restrain
state officials from acting under these laws was stayed by the court until January 31, 1963,
to permit legislative action or appeal to the Supreme Court. Mr. Chief Justice Warren
granted a further stay on December 15, 1962.
Washington
Thigpen v. Meyers, Civil No. 5597, W.D. Wash., Dec. 13, 1962 (31 U.S.L. WEEK 2305).
The court declined to interfere with congressional districting where the vote of a person
in the least populous district is worth 1.5 times the vote of a person in the most populous
district. The same court concluded that the existing state legislative apportionment was
invidiously discriminatory and refused to decline jurisdiction because of the defeat of
an initiative reapportionment measure at the election of November 6, 1962. The court
retained jurisdiction pending opportunity for legislative correction in 1963.
Wisconsin
Wisconsin v. Zimmerman, 205 F. Supp. 673, dismissed without prejudice, 209 F. Supp.
183 (W.D. Wis. 1962). The court declined to enjoin conduct of the 1962 election on the
basis of the existing apportionment (the legislature's further partial reapportionment had
been vetoed by the governor). Believing the 1963 legislature should be given a reasonable time for corrective action, the court dismissed without prejudice.
Wyoming
Wyoming ex rel. Whitehead v. Gage, Civil Docket 53, No. 161, Appeal No. 3143, Wyo.
Sup. Ct., 1962. The suit challenges existing state legislative apportionment, seeking mandamus against the secretary of state.

